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WHEN DID THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
CEASE TO BE LAW?
Vasan Kesavan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Professors Lawson and Seidman have done it again with a provoc-
ative article entitled When Did the Constitution Become Law ?1 I must con-
fess that upon first reading their article as it was going to press in late
2001 I was seething with envy. The question of when did the Constitu-
tion become law is one that has received virtually no attention. 2 It is
the kind of arcane question of constitutional law that only dedicated
* Vice President, Francisco Partners. J.D., Yale Law School, 2001. For their
helpful comments and suggestions, thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Jonathan
F. Cohn, Daniel Farber, Martin Flaherty, David Fontana, Kumar Kesavan, Jennifer
Koester, Gary Lawson, Nick Levin, and Michael Paulsen. Special thanks to Gary
Lawson for initially suggesting that I write this Essay, and for his ongoing
encouragement, and to Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman for their gracious Essay in
reply.
1 Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law ?, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Be-
come Law?]. For another recent and provocative article by Lawson and Seidman, see
Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without Authority,
95 Nw. U. L. REv. 581 (2001) [hereinafter Lawson & Seidman, The Hobbesian
Constitution].
2 Although Lawson and Seidman's article-length creativity is to be celebrated, it
is worth remembering that the question of when the Constitution was adopted reared
its ugly head a few years ago at the University of Minnesota. See Contest, Was George
Washington Constitutional?, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 137 (1995) (arguing that President
Washington was a citizen of Virginia, which was not one of the first nine States to
ratify the Constitution, and was therefore not a citizen of the United States at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution under Article VII, and hence was ineligible to be
President under Article II, § 1, cl. 5); cf U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (Presidential
Eligibility Clause) ("No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the
United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office
of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have
attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the
United States.") (emphasis added). For the sole published response to this contest,
see Jordan Steiker et al., Taking Text and Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional Interpre-
tation and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REv. 237 (1995).
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formalists and historicists would really care about.3 Even after 213
years (or should I say 212 years?!), 4 there is much in constitutional law
that remains to be said, about the past that is. And it is the kind of
question that makes for a great trivia question in constitutional law
because it forces constitutional lawyers to think carefully about text,
history, and structure.., as well as the early nineteenth-century con-
ventional wisdom handed down from no American jurist more cele-
brated than Chief Justice John Marshall. 5
According to that conventional wisdom, elaborated by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall in the case of Owings v. Speed,6 the Constitution did not
become law until the spring of 1789, 7 although Article VII of the Con-
stitution plainly states that "[t]he Ratification of the Conventions of
nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitu-
tion between the States so ratifying the Same," and the requisite nine
ratifications occurred in the early summer of 1788.9
3 To be sure, Lawson and Seidman do make clear the modern significance of
their seemingly arcane inquiry. See infra text accompanying notes 19-27.
4 According to the conventional wisdom, the effective date of the Constitution
was March 4, 1789, when the first session of the First Congress began. See Owings v.
Speed, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420, 422 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.). Marshall's conclusion
implies only 212 years under the Constitution. According to Lawson and Seidman,
the effective date of (at least part of) the Constitution was definitely sometime in the
early summer of 1788. See Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?,
supra note 1, at 2. Their conclusion implies 213 years under the Constitution.
5 On ChiefJustice Marshall's legacy, see, for example, Symposium, The Legacy of
ChiefJustice John Marshall, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1321 (2002); and Symposium, Chief
Justice John Marshall and the United States Supreme Court, 1801-1835, 33J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 743 (2000).
6 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420 (1820) (Marshall, CJ.).
7 See id. at 422-23.
8 U.S. CONST. art. VII.
9 New Hampshire became the ninth State to ratify the Constitution on June 21,
1788. See General Ratification Chronology, 1786-1791, in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION xxi (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., 2000) [hereinafter DHRC]. Virginia became the tenth State to ratify
the Constitution just a few days later on June 25, 1788, 8 id., ostensibly without knowl-
edge of New Hampshire's ratification. See Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitu-
tion Become Law?, supra note 1, at 1 n.2. NewYork became the eleventh State to ratify
the Constitution on July 20, 1788. 8 DHRC, supra, at xxi.
Importantly, North Carolina and Rhode Island did not ratify the Constitution
until after the spring of 1789, when the new federal government was fully effective.
North Carolina became the twelfth State to ratify the Constitution on November 21,
1789, after the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the submission of the Bill of
Rights to the States (to name just two actions taken by the new federal government),
after having refused to ratify the Constitution on August 2, 1788. 8 id. Rhode Island,
the true renegade State, became the last of the original thirteen States to ratify the
Constitution on May 29, 1790, 8 id., after significant pressure by the First Congress to
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The facts of the case are fascinating. In that 1820 case, in what
was effectively the taking of private property for public use without
just compensation, John C. Owings claimed that a statute passed by
the Virginia Legislature in December of 1788 impaired the obligation
of contract represented by his land patent issued by the Common-
wealth of Virginia, in violation of the Contracts Clause of Article I,
Section 10, which provides that "[n]o state shall.., pass any... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.'" Owings could not, of
course, raise any federal takings claims given that there was no restric-
tion on state takings of private property in the original Constitution."
Chief Justice Marshall, in a short and arguably hastily written opinion,
ruled against Owings on the basis that the Constitution did not be-
come law until (at least) March 4, 1789, when the first session of the
First Congress began.' 2
join the Union, see Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U.
CHI. L. Rxv. 475, 480 (1995), and then only after a very close vote of 34 to 32. See 8
DHRC, supra, at xxi.
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
11 See, e.g., Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-48 (1833).
The Takings Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation."), was not incorporated against the States
as a matter of judicial doctrine until 1897. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (Harlan, J.) (holding that the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment was incorporated against the States by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment). The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment also
contemplated the incorporation of the Takings Clause against the States by the same
clause. See A.KHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
182 n.4 (1998) (discussing Representative John Bingham's conception of the Takings
Clause as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
12 Wrote Chief Justice Marshall,
Both Governments could not be understood to exist at the same time. The
new Government did not commence until the old Government expired. It is
apparent that the Government did not commence on the Constitution being
ratified by the ninth State; for these ratifications were to be reported to Con-
gress, whose continuing existence was recognised by the Convention, and
who were requested to continue to exercise their powers for the purpose of
bringing the new government into operation. In fact, Congress did con-
tinue to act as a government until it dissolved on the first of November, by
the successive disappearance of its members. It existed potentially until the
2d of March, the day preceding that on which the members of the new Con-
gress were directed to assemble.
Owings, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 422.
In fact, as Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged in his next paragraph, the new
government could not be fully effective until a President was sworn into office, see id.
at 422-23, which would make the effective date of the Constitution April 30, 1789.
But to be even more precise, and as ChiefJustice Marshall failed to acknowledge, the
new government could not be completely effective until a Supreme Court existed as
2002]
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In their article, Lawson and Seidman take on this Marshallian
conventional wisdom. There is much to be admired in Lawson and
Seidman's exposition, both substantively and methodologically. They
should be thanked for bringing the little-known case of Owings v.
Speed into the legal limelight. 13 They should be praised for critically
questioning the longstanding conventional wisdom and for asking
what may seem to be the tough questions of constitutional law.
14
More importantly, they should be congratulated for finally cor-
recting the longstanding conventional wisdom. They marshal (no pun
intended) much evidence to show that Chief Justice Marshall just had
well. See infra note 34, which would make the effective date of thc Constitution some-
time between the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, on September 24,
1789, and February 2, 1790, the date the Supreme Court was organized. See A Brief
Overview of the Supreme Court, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/
about.html (last updated Sept. 16, 2002); History of the Supreme Court, at http://
supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/supcthist.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2002).
13 A search of the relevant database reveals that there are only seven citations to
the case in the legal literature (at least that literature that is electronically available),
excluding their article. Search of WESTLAW, JLR Library (January 1, 2002). See Ack-
erman & Katyal, supra note 9; Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent" in Historical Perspective:
Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001 (1991); Hans W. Baade, Time and Meaning:
Notes on the Intertemporal Law of Statutory Construction and Constitutional Interpretation, 43
AM. J. COMP. L. 319, 337 n.144 (1995); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: State and Congressional Powers, 1801-1835, 49 U. CI. L. REV. 887, 921 n.237
(1982); James W. Ely, Jr., The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A Reappraisal, 33 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1023 (2000); Mark R. Killenbeck & Steve Sheppard, Another Such
Victory? Term Limits, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Right to Representation,
45 HASTINGS L.J. 1121, 1149 n.133 (1994); Ted L. Wills, Note, Religious Landmarks,
Guidelines for Analysis: Free Exercise, Takings, and Least Restrictive Means, 53 OHIo ST. L.J.
211, 215 n.35 (1992). Indeed, no major constitutional law casebook lists the case in
its table of cases.
For another article-length effort by Lawson and Seidman discussing another ob-
scure case with fascinating implications for constitutional law, see Lawson & Seidman,
The Hobbesian Constitution, supra note 1 (discussing Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16
How.) 164 (1854)).
14 In this regard, Professor Ackerman also deserves a lot of credit for asking the
tough questions of constitutional law, whether or not one subscribes to his views of
the Constitution. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 32-95
(1998) (asking whether the adoption of the Constitution was illegal under the Articles
of Confederation); id. at 99-252 (asking whether the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments' proposal and adoption were unconstitutional); Ackerman & Katyal,
supra note 9. For a forceful response to Professor Ackerman's provocative claims
about the constitutionality of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, see John
Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375
(2001).
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it wrong when it comes to the effective date of the Contracts Clause.15
Indeed, Professor Pfander first made the point in 1998: "Ibly its
terms, then, the Ratification Clause makes clear that the constitu-
tional limits in Article I, Section 10 were to take effect on the date of
the ninth ratification (or, for such subsequent ratifiers as North Caro-
lina and Rhode Island, on the date of their accession)."i 6 There is no
question, in my mind at least, that the Contracts Clause was effective
in the early summer of 1788,17 well before the Virginia Legislature
15 See Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at
13 ("[T]he evidence is overwhelming that at least some parts of the Constitution-
those which did not require implementation by the new federal legislature and execu-
tive-were in effect immediately upon ratification."). It should not come as too much
surprise that Chief Justice Marshall made a legal mistake. This was not his first. See,
e.g., Alex Kozinski, That Unfortunate Immortal Phrase, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 977.
16 See James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the
Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1269, 1293 (1998). Pfander argues,
[Article VII] clearly declares the effectiveness of the Constitution as running
not from the date of its completion (in September 1787), but from the date
of its approval by the requisite number of states (inJune 1788). It also leaves
open the possibility that states might join the Union after the Constitution's
effectiveness (as did Rhode Island and North Carolina) and subject them-
selves to the federal restrictions of Article I as of the date of their accession.
Id. at 1276-77.
17 I intentionally refer to the early summer of 1788 instead of a specific date for
the birthdate of our Constitution. Lawson and Seidman strongly believe that the Con-
stitution was adopted on June 21, 1788, the date of New Hampshire's decisive ninth
ratification. See Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note
1, at 24 (stating that the Constitution was adopted on June 21, 1788 and that "[a]ll
subsequent events, such as notification to Congress and the other states and verifica-
tion by Congress of the authenticity of the ratifying documents, merely communicate
or give evidence of the relevant event").
There are, however, at least two other possibilities: the date that New Hamp-
shire's ratification was received by the Confederation Congress, which was somewhere
around July 2, 1788, see id. at 2, 5, or more relevantly, perhaps the date that the other
eight States became aware of New Hampshire's ratification, at which point their right
to repeal their ratifications lapsed. Cf Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of
Article V.- The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677,
683 (1993) (arguing that Congress may repeal proposals and the States may repeal
ratifications of amendments to the Constitution until, but not after, the necessary
three-quarters of the States have ratified the amendments).
The proper resolution of the Constitution's birthdate would take a little more
space than is available here, but whether that date be June 21, 1788, or some day
shortly thereafter, it is beyond question that the Constitution was adopted in the early
summer of 1788. See Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law ?,supra
note 1, at 2 (making same point).
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passed a statute impairing Mr. Owings's land patent.18 Owings should
not have lost his case for the reasons given by Chief Justice Marshall.
Lawson and Seidman should also be applauded for making clear
the modern significance of their seemingly arcane inquiry.' 9 They
discuss the Oneida Indian Nation cases 20 of the early 1980s.2 The facts
of those cases are also fascinating. The Oneida Indian Nation sued
the State of New York in order to recover five million acres of land in
upstate New York that it claimed were purchased by the State of New
York through an unconstitutional treaty made on September 22, 1788,
after the Constitution was adopted in the early summer of 1788 and
after New York joined the Union on July 26, 1788.22 The State Treaty
Clause of Article I, Section 10 provides that "[n]o State shall enter
into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation."23 The federal district
court "flatly dismissed ' 24 the Oneida Nation's claim that the treaty was
18 Lawson and Seidman rightly express no hesitation on this question. See Law-
son & Seidman, Wen Did the Constitution Become Law ?, supra note 1, at 8 ("It is virtually
certain that Owings was wrongly decided."); id. at 24 (stating that Chief Justice Mar-
shall was "simply wrong" as to the effective date of the Contracts Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1); id. at 35 (referring to "ChiefJustice Marshall's ancient blunder"); id.
("How could [Chief Justice Marshall] make such an obvious mistake in Owings about
something as basic as the effective date of the Constitution?").
19 In addition to the point made in the text, Lawson and Seidman offer two other
reasons for their inquiry that deserve brief mention. They claim that the effective
date of the Constitution may have some important implications for an ongoing de-
bate by Professors Ackerman and Amar as to the legality of the adoption of the Con-
stitution. See id. at 3-4. For the debate between Ackerman and Amar, see id. at 3 n.10
(citing 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 41-44 (1991); 2 BRUCE ACK-
ERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 49-68 (1998); Ackerman & Kaytal, supra
note 9, at 539-58; Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constiutional Amend-
ment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457, 462-87 (1994); Akhil Reed Amar, Phila-
delphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1043,
1047-60 (1988)). Lawson and Seidman also claim that the effective date of the Con-
stitution is something to get right purely as a matter of history. See Lawson & Seidman,
When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at 4.
20 See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 520 F. Supp. 1278 (N.D.N.Y. 1981),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 691 F.2d 1070 (2d Cir. 1982), remanded to 649 F. Supp. 420
(N.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 860 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Oneida Indian Nation v.
New York, 102 F.R.D. 445 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 732 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1984); Oneida
Indian Nation v. New York, 102 F.R.D. 450 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), remanded to 757 F.2d 19
(2d Cir. 1985), motion to recall mandate denied, 771 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1985).
21 See Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at
2-3; id. at 31-35 (describing the chronology of the lawsuit).
22 See id. at 31-32. For a full presentation of the facts, see Oneida Indian Nation,
860 F.2d at 1148-49; Oneida Indian Nation, 520 F. Supp. at 1286-88.
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
24 Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at 3
(citing Oneida Indian Nation, 520 F. Supp. at 1323).
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unconstitutional on the strength of Chief Justice Marshall's declara-
tion in Owings v. Speed.2 5 To the extent that the Oneida Indian Nation
cases fully turned on the effective date of the Constitution, 26 I am con-
vinced that a good chunk of upstate New York properly belongs to the
Oneida Indian Nation, the choice of remedies aside. 27
Not surprisingly, Lawson and Seidman go well beyond the spe-
cific questions of the effective date of the Contracts Clause in Owings
and the State Treaty Clause in Oneida Indian Nation and the correc-
tion of Chief Justice Marshall's "ancient blunder"28 to announce a
general theory of constitutional effectiveness. According to this the-
ory, "[d] ifferent clauses of the Constitution actually became effective
at different points in time." 29 They aptly refer to this theory as "a
multi-tiered theory of constitutional effectiveness."3 0
25 The conclusion of the federal district court is well worth repeating:
Crucial to the plaintiffs' argument is their assertion that the Constitution was
in effect on September 22, 1788, the date on which the Treaty was con-
cluded. The plaintiffs contend that the Constitution became effective after
ratification by the ninth State on June 21, 1788, with New York ratifying in
July of 1788.
However, the Supreme Court long ago concluded otherwise in a case in
which the issue was whether the provisions of the Constitution applied to
acts of state legislatures in 1788....
The Court in Owings ruled that the Constitution did not become opera-
tive until the first Wednesday in March of 1789, the date set by resolution of
the old government. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims under the Constitution
must fail.
Oneida Indian Nation, 520 F. Supp. at 1323.
26 To be sure, there were a host of issues in the Oneida Indian Nation case other
than effective date of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution. See Oneida Indian Na-
tion, 860 F.2d at 1145-67 (determining if the issue was a non justiciable political ques-
tion, if the Eleventh Amendment provided New York immunity from the suit, if the
Oneida Indian Nation had standing to challenge the validity of the treaties, and if the
Oneida Indian Nation stated a claim upon which relief could be granted); Oneida
Indian Nation, 520 F. Supp. at 1283-1329 (same). Whether the case fully turned on
the effective date of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution may well be worth a
separate article.
27 Lawson and Seidman hold open the possibility that "[p]erhaps concerns about
justiciability or remedies would, and should, have ultimately prevented the Oneidas
from reclaiming their land." Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become
Law?, supra note 1, at 34-35.
28 Id. at 35.
29 Id. at 4; see also id. at 9 (stating that "the Constitution becomes operative in
stages, so that different portions of the document create rights and obligations at
different points in time"); id. at 37 ("The Constitution became law over a period of
time beginning on June 21, 1788.").
30 Id. at 8-27.
2002]
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A short summary of the theory is both necessary and proper. The
theory comes in two broad tiers. One tier consists of provisions such
as the Contracts Clause, the State Treaty Clause and others contained
in Article I, Section 10 that limit the power of the States. These provi-
sions are "self-executing" 31 in that they require no additional action by
any governmental actors and hence became effective at the date of
adoption of the Constitution.32
The second tier consists of provisions such as many of those con-
tained in Article I, Article II, and though Lawson and Seidman do not
quite mention it, Article III. These provisions are not self-executing,
and hence became effective at points after the date of adoption of the
Constitution. For example, the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers of the newly established federal government (obviously) could
not be effective until it had legislative, executive, and judicial person-
nel to exercise those powers. 33 Thus, much of Articles I and II only
became effective well after the early summer of 1788 when the Consti-
tution was adopted. As Lawson and Seidman explain, "[t] he national
government could not pass laws, make treaties, or appoint officers un-
til the Congress and the President were, both formally and function-
31 Id. at 10.
32 See id. at 8-10, 23-24. Some provisions of Article I, § 10, namely those
"clauses" in Article 1, § 10, cl. 3, conditionally deny power to the States, holding out the
possibility that State action is not unconstitutional if Congress provides its consent.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any
Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in
War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay."
(emphasis added)). In contrast to the other clauses of Article I, Section 10, these
clauses are not nearly as self-executing, and perhaps are not effective at the date of
adoption of the Constitution in the early summer of 1788, but on April 30, 1789,
when there was both a Congress and a President. Lawson and Seidman do not discuss
these clauses.
33 See Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at
28 ("The new government clearly could not exercise legislative, executive, or judicial
authority until it had legislative, executive, and judicial personnel capable of carrying
those powers into effect."); see also id. at 9 ("[O]ne could say that the provisions of the
Constitution that require legislative and presidential action-and this includes some
of the most important provisions-could not be fully 'in effect' until all of the execu-
tory steps necessary for its establishment had taken place." (emphasis added)); id. at
19 (discussing early state constitutions) ("Other provisions that require action by offi-
cials under the new government cannot, of course, take effect until those officials are
in place."); id. at 23 ("[S]ome provisions were incapable of taking effect immediately
[in the early summer of 1788] because they required action by governmental actors
who did not yet exist.").
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ally, in office. These provisions thus did not become legally operative
until April 30, 1789." 3 4
One important conclusion of their "multi-tiered theory of consti-
tutional effectiveness" is that Chief Justice Marshall was partially right
but mostly wrong to declare that the Constitution commenced on
March 4, 1789. The date aside, he was wrong to believe that the Con-
stitution must be effective or ineffective in toto.35 The important in-
sight from Lawson and Seidman is that some of the Constitution's
provisions did not become effective until March 4, 1789, or even April
30, 1789, but many "self-executing" provisions did become effective in
the early summer of 1788. Thus, Lawson and Seidman maintain that
34 Id. at 9. Some provisions of Article I became effective on March 4, 1789, when
Congress convened for the first time, or shortly thereafter when there was a quorum
in each of the House of Representatives and the Senate. These provisions of Article I
do not depend on the presence or absence of non-legislative constitutional actors.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives shall chuse their
Speaker and other Officers .... "); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5 ("The Senate shall chuse their
other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice Presi-
dent, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States."); id. art.
I, § 5, cl. 1 ("Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifica-
tions of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do
Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized
to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Pen-
alties as each House may provide."); id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine
the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with
the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member."); id. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 ("Each House
shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, ex-
cepting such Parts as may in theirJudgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of
the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those
Present, be entered on the Journal.").
What about much of Article III? Although Lawson and Seidman hardly discuss
Article III, see Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1
at 29-31, the Constitution could not be fully effective until there was a Supreme
Court, which did not occur until sometime around February 2, 1790. See supra note
12. The Supreme Court is a necessary and sufficient part of the judicial power of the
United States. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish."); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other
Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make.").
35 See Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law ?, supra note 1, at 9
("Marshall [assumed] in Owings... that the Constitution must be operative or not as
a whole."); id. at 28 ("Marshall's all-or-nothing view of constitutional effectiveness is
simply unwarranted.").
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"[o]ne could therefore agree with [Chief Justice] Marshall that some
of the Constitution's provisions did not take effect until March or
April 1789, but still maintain that Owings should have won his case
because the Contracts Clause was effective upon ratification. '3 6 This
much of their "multi-tiered theory of constitutional effectiveness"
should be (relatively) uncontroversial.
Although there is much in their article with which I agree, there
is one lingering doubt that I have about their multi-tiered theory of
constitutional effectiveness. 37 This one lingering doubt is the subject
of this Essay. Lawson and Seidman's multi-tiered theory of constitu-
tional effectiveness begs the question of what happened in the period
between the Constitution's adoption date in the early summer of 1788
and the spring of 1789 when much of Articles I and II became effec-
tive (the "transition period"). Indeed, ChiefJustice Marshall's conven-
tional wisdom begs the same question.
When did the Articles of Confederation cease to be law?38 There
are only two possible answers. Was the old regime under the Articles
of Confederation legally defunct in the early summer of 1788 when
the Constitution was adopted? Or was the old regime under the Arti-
cles of Confederation legally operative, continuing to exercise author-
ity under the Articles of Confederation until a Congress and a
President came into being in the spring of 1789?39 This is the ques-
tion of transition between the two regimes of the Articles of Confeder-
ation and the Constitution.
36 Id. at 10.
37 This is not to say, of course, that I have no other quibbles with other points in
their article. I do, but they pale in comparison to the one presented in the text. See
E-mail from Vasan Kesavan, to Gary Lawson, Professor, Boston University School of
Law (Dec. 19, 2001) (on file with author).
38 Admittedly, this query begs the question of whether the Articles of Confedera-
tion enjoyed the status of law immediately prior to the adoption of the Constitution in
the early summer of 1788. James Madison, among others, thought not, given the
many breaches of the Articles of Confederation by the States. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST
No. 43, at 279-80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (advocating for the
new Constitution in light of the ineffectiveness of the Articles of Confederation). The
legal status of the Articles of Confederation during the Founding (and the legality of
the Constitution's adoption under the Articles of Confederation) is the subject of a
longstanding debate between Professors Ackerman and Amar, see supra note 19, and I
will not enter that debate here. I assume for present purposes that the Articles of
Confederation enjoyed the status of law until displaced by the Constitution. The
question concerning the legality of the Constitution's adoption under the Articles of
Confederation has no bearing on the transition question that I explore in this Essay.
39 There is a third possibility to be taken up in short order: was the old regime
under the Articles of Confederation legally operative under the Constitution only as
to certain transitional matters?
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Lawson and Seidman have an answer. Early in their article, after
observing that some transition authority was necessary to verify ratifi-
cations and to set a time for the first Congressional elections and the
first presidential election in the several States,40 they conclude that
"the new government could not totally displace the government estab-
lished under the Articles of Confederation immediately upon the
ninth ratification, because the new government did not yet exist. Pro-
visions had to be made for an orderly transition to the new constitu-
tional regime."41 It is not clear from this statement whether Lawson
and Seidman believe that during the transition period the Confedera-
tion Congress merely had limited transitional authority under the
Constitution to put all of the Constitution into effect,4 2 or if the Con-
federation Congress also had legal authority under the Articles of
Confederation to do all of the things it had been doing theretofore.
Elsewhere in their article, however, Lawson and Seidman make
clear that they believe that the Confederation Congress exercised le-
gal authority under the Articles of Confederation during the transi-
tion period. After presenting their multi-tiered theory of
constitutional effectiveness and the obvious point that the Constitu-
tion is not entirely self-executing, 43 they conclude that "[t]his also
means that the preexisting authorities, such as the institutions created
by the Articles of Confederation, were not immediately displaced by
ratification of the new Constitution. The machinery of the old regime
could continue until the machinery of the new regime was in place.
44
Indeed, at one (and only one) point in their article, Lawson and Seid-
40 See Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law ?, supra note 1, at
5. For the constitutional provisions relating to the first Congressional and Presiden-
tial elections, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter
such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators."); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4
("The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on
which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United
States.").
41 Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at 5.
42 The fact that the intervention of the Confederation Congress (or some body)
was necessary to put all of the Constitution into effect surely does not mean that the
Confederation Congress was exercising authority under the Articles of Confederation.
The decisions made by the Continental Congress to set a time for the first Congres-
sional and Presidential elections and to pick a location for the seat of the new federal
government were not decisions made pursuant to the authority of the Articles of Con-
federation. How could they be? The old regime did not and could not empower the
Confederation Congress to take these actions relating to a subsequent regime.
43 See id. at 23.
44 Id. at 23-24.
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man refer to the phenomenon as "'granting a continuance' to preex-
isting institutions." 45 Thus, according to this transition theory, the
transition between the two regimes of the Articles of Confederation
and the Constitution was "gapless" (my word, not theirs).
There is, of course, at least one other possibility-and one that
Lawson and Seidman, in uncharacteristic fashion, completely fail to
mention. That possibility is that the Confederation Congress was a
legal nullity after the adoption of the Constitution in the early sum-
mer of 1788, implying that the Framers and Ratifiers (or more simply,
the Founders) were without a federal government during the transi-
tion period. Although some parts of the Constitution such as Article
I, Section 10 became effective on the adoption date and some parts of
the Constitution such as Article I, Section 8 became effective after the
adoption date, one could say that the whole Constitution, as of the
adoption date, "occupied the field" of governmental authority at the
federal level, thereby pre-empting all other then-existing governmen-
tal authority under the Articles of Confederation.
This possibility is non-frivolous. The Founders would not have
been shocked to understand that they would be without a federal gov-
ernment during the transition period. To put it mildly, the Founders
(at least those who supported the Constitution) were not fans of the
federal government under the Articles of Confederation. 4 6 Indeed,
many of the Founders thought that the federal government under
that regime was hardly worthy of the moniker of government. 47 If
45 Id. at 18.
46 The purpose of the Constitution was "to form a more perfect Union," for "We
the People of the United States," U.S. CONST. pmbl., by (among other things) reme-
dying the many defects of the Articles of Confederation. See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 18-19, 24-27 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)
(1832) (including remarks of Governor Edmund Randolph enumerating "the defects
of the confederation") [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION]; Letter from James
Madison, former President of the United States, to Davis, Professor, (1832), in 3 id. at
520 ("In expounding the Constitution and deducing the intention of the framers, it
should never be forgotten, that the great object of the Convention was to provide, by
a new Constitution, a remedy for the defects of the existing one .... "); see also 4 id. at
141 (index entry at "Confederation, discussions on defects"). For key essays written
by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison discussing the defects of the Articles of
Confederation, see THE FEDERALIST Nos. 15 & 16 (arguing against a government by
States, not individuals), 21 (discussing the current weakness of the federal govern-
ment), 22 (discussing the defects in commerce), 24-27 (discussing the defects of de-
fense), and 30 (discussing the defects of taxation).
47 I owe the phrase "moniker of government" to a conversation with Professor
Lawson commenting on Professor Seidman's opinion of the government under the
Articles of Confederation. During the Virginia ratifying convention, the ratifying con-
vention of which we have the most extensive records of debates, Anti-Federalist John
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there were no federal government during the transition period, the
Founders would almost undoubtedly have looked to the governments
of the several States to pick up any slack.48 Moreover, the Founders
were oftentimes without a Congress under the Articles of Confedera-
tion anyway (and when Congress did convene, it was often ineffective
because a quorum was hardly achieved) .49 Thus, according to this
transition theory, there was an interregnum between the Articles of.
Confederation and the Constitution.
Lawson and Seidman jump to the all-too-quick conclusion that
the transition between the two regimes of the Articles of Confedera-
tion and the Constitution was gapless. Although they fail to acknowl-
edge the possibility that the transition between the two regimes was
not gapless, they do leave open the possibility. They are correct that
"the existence of the Constitution did not necessarily preclude the
continuing validity of the Articles of Confederation. ' 50 They are also
undoubtedly correct that "lIt] here is nothing illogical about the simul-
taneous existence of the governmental institutions under the Articles
[of Confederation] and the prohibitions on state action contained in
the Constitution."'5' The question is not whether their transition the-
ory is necessarily precluded by the Constitution or whether their tran-
sition theory is illogical, but whether the Constitution, carefully
considered, actually provides for their transition theory.
In all fairness, it should be noted that the transition question was
not an area of focus for Lawson and Seidman. They do, however, an-
Dawson put the point best when he recognized that "[t]he defects of the articles by
which we are present confederated, have been echoed and re-echoed, not only from
every quarter of this House, but from every part of the continent." Remarks of John
Dawson at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 24, 1788), in 10 THE DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1489 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993); see also 10 id. at 1800 (including an index entry at
"Articles of Confederation, defects of"); 10 id. at 1811 (including an index entry at
"Congress under Articles of Confederation, deficiencies of").
48 Cf Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The First "Establishment" Clause, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 83, 95 (2002) ("[T]here could not possibly be an issue of a 'gap' involv-
ing most governmental powers, because those powers were lodged in the States rather
than in the Confederation organization.").
49 See 34JouRNALs OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at vii (Roscoe R.
Hill ed., 1937) [hereinafter JOURNALS] (summarizing attendance of the States for the
five years of the Continental Congress from 1783-1784 to 1787-1788). The same
principle of occasional meeting carried over to the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 4, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting
shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different
Day." (emphasis added)).
50 Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at 4.
51 Id. at 28.
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swer the transition question, and importantly, they do so needlessly.
The transition question is logically distinct from their question as to
the effectiveness of the Constitution. Their "multi-tiered theory of
constitutional effectiveness" is no less valid if there was or was not a
federal government under the Articles of Confederation during the
transition period.
In this Essay, I take up the question whether the transition be-
tween the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution was gapless
or whether there was an interregnum 52 during the transition period.
The question is perhaps best put by the following hypothetical: assum-
ing that the Confederation Congress made a treaty in the fall of 1788,
the winter of 1788-1789, or the early spring of 1789, would that treaty
be the law of the land?53
I will be among the first to admit that the inquiry into the transi-
tion between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution is
really arcane. It is really arcane in a way that Lawson and Seidman's
inquiry into the effective date of the Contracts Clause 54 and the State
Treaty Clause 55 is simply not. Unlike that inquiry, which properly re-
solves the case of Mr. Owings, and perhaps the cases of the Oneida
Indian Nation, nothing of consequence seems to turn on whether or
not there was a federal government under the Articles of Confedera-
tion during the transition period. But that is not to say that the transi-
tion question is unimportant. It is only after 213 years of the Republic
that we are systematically addressing the question of when the Consti-
tution became effective. While we are at it, we might as well get it
right as a matter of constitutional history.5 6 Why not spill just a little
more ink on the transition question?
In what follows, I hope to persuade you that Lawson and Seid-
man's transition theory is at best not proved and at worst incorrect.
Part II reviews the textual argument. Part III reviews Lawson and Seid-
52 See infra text accompanying note 125.
53 The significance of the choice of treaty and not statute for the hypothetical
shall become clear shortly. See infra text accompanying notes 61-63. The hypotheti-
cal is discussed in Part V infra.
54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
55 Id.
56 Cf Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at
4. Lawson and Seidman noted,
If history books had consistently reported the year of the Norman Conquest
as 1067 and we now discovered that it actually happened in 1066, it probably
would not change much of consequence in the world, but one might as well
get it right. This is particularly true with something as basic as the effective
date of the Constitution.
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man's extra-textual evidence supporting their transition theory. Part
IV introduces new extra-textual evidence into the debate. Part V takes
account of the journey and proposes a theory of transition.
II. READING THE TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION
As a "most ardent textualist,"57 I logically start with the text of the
Constitution.58 There are arguably only three provisions in the origi-
nal Constitution that directly bear on the transition question. Let us
briefly review these three provisions.
The first provision is, of course, Article VII which declares that
"[t]he Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be suffi-
cient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so
ratifying the Same."59 Article VII makes clear that the requisite ratifi-
cations are enough to establish the Constitution as a new regime as
between the States so ratifying, superseding the old regime of the Arti-
cles of Confederation. It would seem that an establishment of the Con-
stitution as a whole is the disestablishment of the Articles of
Confederation as a whole, in the absence of any provision to the con-
trary elsewhere in the Constitution. 60 But Article VII does not explic-
itly address the transition question. It is plausible that the
Confederation Congress had legal authority under the Articles of
Confederation during the transition period.
The second provision is the Supremacy Clause, which declares
that
[t] his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the su-
57 See id. at 23.
58 Of course, even the "most ardent textualist" will recognize that context is im-
portant to interpretation and have recourse to extra-textual evidence. See, e.g., id.
59 U.S. CONST. art. VII.
60 Interestingly, the draft of Article VII referred to by the Framers to the Commit-
tee of Style provided: "The ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be
sufficient for organising this Constitution between the said States." See 2 RECORDS OF
THE CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 579. For other descriptions of the meaning of
Article VII, see, for example, 2 id. at 468 (remarks of James Wilson) (referring to
"commencement of the plan"); 2 id (remarks of Gouverneur Morris) (referring to
"introduction of the Government"); 2 id. at 475 (remarks of Rufus King) (referring to
"operation of the Govt."); and 2 id. (remarks of Roger Sherman) (referring to "ex-
ecut[ing] the Constitution"). In the course of ratification, Article VII was described as
a requirement that nine States are "sufficient to put the government in motion." See,
e.g., Reply to a Landholder II, in 3 RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 46, at
299; Remarks of Gov. Edmund Randolph at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June
4, 1788), in 3 RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 308.
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preme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding. 6 1
The Supremacy Clause makes clear by negative implication that the
laws of the Confederation Congress are not the law of the land as far
as the Constitution is concerned. Although treaties "made" (note the
past tense) by the Confederation Congress are the law of the land,
only laws which "shall be made" (note the future tense) by the Con-
gress under the Constitution are the law of the land.62 When the
Framers wanted to give prospective force to the acts of the Confedera-
tion Congress, they knew how to do so. The Supremacy Clause sug-
gests that there could be a gap between the two regimes of the Articles
of Confederation and the Constitution because the acts of the Con-
federation Congress were a legal nullity under the Constitution any-
way. But the Supremacy Clause, like Article VII, does not explicitly
address the transition question. It is plausible that the Confederation
Congress had legal authority under the Articles of Confederation dur-
ing the transition period. And the Supremacy Clause only begs the
more interesting question whether a treaty made by the Confedera-
tion Congress after the early summer of 1788, but before at least
March 4, 1789,63 would be the law of the land under the "third clause"
of the Supremacy Clause.
61 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
62 Professor Pfander has also amply made this point in discussing the phrase "and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof" in the
Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., Pfander, supra note 16, at 1277 ("While [the Supremacy
Clause] provides for the supremacy of the new Constitution itself and of any laws
passed 'in Pursuance thereof,' the Clause notably refrains from making the provisions
of the old Articles of Confederation and the acts of the old Congress supreme and
binding upon the states."); id. at 1296 ("This description includes all statutes that the
new post-ratification Congress might choose to enact (within constitutional limits),
but it excludes laws that the old Congress had enacted under the aegis of the Articles
of Confederation."); id. at 1298 ("By limiting supremacy to '[t]his Constitution, and
the Laws ... made in Pursuance thereof,' the Supremacy Clause omits any binding
effect for any of the laws of Congress passed in the Articles of Confederation era.").
63 I say "at least" March 4, 1789, because the treaty-making power under the Con-
stitution is vested in the President and the Senate, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and
there was no President until sometime around April 30, 1789. Cf Lawson & Seidman,
When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at 2 ("Provisions that require the
action of the President did not become effective until a President had been properly
elected and sworn into office on April 30, 1789."). Under Lawson and Seidman's
transition theory, it would seem that, in order for there to be a gapless transition vis-ft-
vis the treaty-making power, the Confederation Congress could make a treaty after March
4, 1789, but before April 30, 1789-a period of time during which the First Congress
was in session! See Session Dates of Congress (March 4, 1789 to present), at http://
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The third provision and, I submit, the most interesting one, is the
Engagements Clause, which is juxtaposed with the Supremacy Clause.
The Engagements Clause provides that "[a]ll Debts contracted and
Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution,
shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as
under the Confederation. '64 Nowhere do Lawson and Seidman men-
tion the Engagements Clause in the course of their article.65 The En-
gagements Clause impliedly addresses the transition question. By
making valid only the Engagements entered into by the Confedera-
tion Congress before the adoption of the Constitution, the Engage-
ments Clause squarely suggests by negative implication that
engagements entered into by the Confederation Congress after the
adoption of the Constitution shall not be valid against the United
States under the Constitution as under the Articles of Confedera-
tion.66 This would make perfect sense if there were no Confederation
Congress after the adoption of the Constitution.
The point is made more striking by comparing the Engagements
Clause with its precursor in the Articles of Confederation. Article XII
of the Articles of Confederation declared that "[a]ll bills of credit
emitted, monies borrowed and debts contracted by, or under the au-
thority of Congress, before the assembling of the United States, in
pursuance of the present confederation, shall be deemed and consid-
ered as a charge against the United States. '67 This clause, unlike the
Engagements Clause, squarely suggests that engagements entered into
clerk.house.gov/histHigh/Congressional_History/Session-Dates/sessionsAl.php
(last updated Oct. 1, 2002).
64 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1.
65 A search of the relevant database reveals that there are only five citations to the
Clause by name in the legal literature (at least the literature that is electronically
available). Search of WESTLAW, JLR Library (Jan. 1, 2002).
66 Interestingly, the draft of the Engagements Clause referred by the Framers to
the Committee of Style provided, "All debts contracted and engagements entered
into, by or under the authority of Congress shall be as valid against the United States
under this constitution as under the confederation." 2 RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION,
supra note 46, at 571. This draft did not employ the phrase "before the adoption of
this Constitution."
In their reply, Lawson and Seidman suggest that, as an intratextual matter, the
difference in word choice between "adoption" in the Engagements Clause and "Estab-
lishment" in Article VII might be taken to mean that the time of the Constitution's
adoption and that of its establishment are different moments. See Lawson & Seidman,
supra note 48, at 94. This intratextual inference fails to persuade because the words
"adoption" and "establishment" are elegant variations on the same idea, and because
the Engagements Clause and Article VII ought to be presumed to be read in pari
materia.
67 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XII. (U.S. 1781).
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by the Congress after the adoption of the Articles of Confederation
but before the date the first Congress under the Articles of Confedera-
tion was to "assemble" were valid against the United States. 68 Of
course, no analogous language appears in the Engagements Clause.
The Engagements Clause does not say, "All Debts contracted and En-
gagements entered into, before the assembling of the Congress in
pursuance of the Constitution, shall be as valid against the United
States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation." But
whatever the Engagements Clause does and does not say, the Clause
does not explicitly address the transition question. And the spirit or
intention of the Engagements Clause would seem to favor a gapless
transition of obligations.
What shall we make of these three provisions as a coherent
whole? The answer should be obvious. It is beyond dispute that the
text of the Constitution does not explicitly address the transition ques-
tion.69 As a matter of the most careful textual analysis, it is plausible
that Lawson and Seidman are correct that there was a gapless transi-
tion between the two regimes of the Articles of Confederation and the
Constitution. It is also equally plausible, however, that there was an
interregnum between the two regimes. The text of the Constitution
does not provide an answer to the transition question. 70
68 But see 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1828 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833) ("The articles of confederation
contained a similar stipulation in respect to the bills of credit emitted, monies bor-
rowed, and debts contracted, by or under the authority of congress, before the ratifica-
tion of the confederation." (emphasis added)).
69 See also Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law ? supra note 1,
at 6.
70 As this Essay was going to press, I became aware of a fourth provision of the
Constitution that bears on the transition question and which I had previously over-
looked. Article I, Section 10 provides that "[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance, or Confederation." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. This "self-executing" provi-
sion, of course, took effect immediately upon the adoption of the Constitution. See
Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at 24. (noting
that "Article I, Section 10 restraints on state power ... do take effect immediately");
Lawson & Seidman, supra note 48, at 95 (stating that the aforementioned part of
Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 was "one of the immediately operative provisions of the
Constitution"). This provision squarely suggests that ratifying States under the Consti-
tution are prohibited from simultaneous membership in the Union under the Articles
of Confederation, which is a "Confederation" for the purposes of Article I, Section 10.
See also ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION arts. I, II, III (U.S. 1781) (using "confederacy,"
"Confederation," and "firm league of friendship" to describe governmental regime).
James Madison, for his part, described the Articles of Confederation as a treaty be-
tween the several States, see 1 RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 314-15;
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279-80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), but
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Indeed, it may be that the lack of an express transition provision
has some important implications. According to Lawson and Seidman,
"[i] t is interesting and significant that the Framers did not write the
details of a transitional period into Article VII.' '7 1 The significance of
the omission may be in one direction or another, and we will need
some background rule of interpretation to decide. We should re-
member that textual arguments by negative implication are some-
times tricky. 72 To resolve the transition question, we will need
recourse to extra-textual evidence. To that evidence, I now turn.
whether the Articles of Confederation is precisely a "Treaty," "Alliance," or "Confeder-
ation" for the purposes of Article I, Section 10 is not of particular importance here.
In their reply, Lawson and Seidman also briefly make note of this constitutional
provision, and claim that this clause "does not forbid [ratifying States] from continu-
ing to participate in an existing treaty or alliance with other States," by which they
evidently mean other non-ratifying States. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 46, at 99
n.66 (emphasis added). This reading of Article I, Section 10, emphasizing the pro-
spective nature of the phrase "enter into" and its negative implication, is a little too
wooden, even for my formalist tastes. There is little doubt in my mind that existing
treaties, alliances, or confederations involving the ratifying States were null and void
upon the adoption of the Constitution-just as existing ex post facto laws or bills of
attainder on the statute books of ratifying States would be null and void upon the
adoption of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ...
pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts . . . ."). To be sure, given the consistent prospective phraseology of Article I,
Section 10, this interpretation is all or nothing: either past and prospective State ac-
tions are prohibited or only prospective State action is prohibited. Neither Lawson
and Seidman's interpretation nor mine are inevitable, and Article I, Section 10 is a
rather blunt instrument for dissecting the transition question. That said, Lawson and
Seidman's interpretation of Article I, Section 10 goes too far as there is nothing in
that section that forbids ratifying States from continuing to participate in the Union
under the Articles of Confederation even after the First Congress convened in March
of 1789. Perhaps other parts of the Constitution make clear that the Constitution is
an exclusive Union among ratifying States. See U.S. CONST. pmbl; id. art. VI, cl. 2; id.
art. VII. Special thanks to Jonathan F. Cohn for helping me to work through these
interesting possibilities.
71 Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at 6.
72 Textual arguments from negative implication (i.e., "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius") must be contextually and sensitively applied to avoid wooden readings of the
Constitution. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L.
REV. 647, 653 n.30 (1996); Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges
and Immunities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REv. 701, 702-08 (1995);
David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1791, 1815-36 (1998).
For a classic exposition of this canon of interpretation, see THE FEDERALIST Nos. 32,
83 (Alexander Hamilton).
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III. REVIEWING LAWSON AND SEIDMAN'S
EXTRA-TEXTUAL EVIDENCE
In Part I.C of their article, Lawson and Seidman take up their
"multi-tiered theory of constitutional effectiveness. '73 In a sub-section
entitled "Lessons from the Law," they carefully set forth the interpre-
tive rules for three kinds of key legal instruments: treaties, state consti-
tutions, and statutes.74 They correctly point out that all three kinds of
legal instruments were understood to be effective on their adoption
date, unless otherwise specified. 75 They also correctly point out that
all three kinds of legal instruments were understood to be capable of
containing provisions that would be effective at different times. 76 This
much is wholly unassailable.
These two insights, however, do not bear on the transition ques-
tion. A legal instrument may contain provisions that would be effec-
tive at different times in the future, but may nonetheless completely
invalidate a prior legal instrument as of the date of the new legal in-
strument's date of adoption. In order to determine an answer to the
transition question, we need an interpretive baseline. For example,
does the absence of a transition rule mean that the old regime contin-
ued to exercise authority after the new regime was adopted but before
the new regime became effective, unless otherwise specified-imply-
ing a gapless transition? Or does the absence of a transition rule
mean that no one continued to exercise authority after the new re-
gime was adopted but before the new regime became effective, unless
otherwise specified-implying an interregnum?
We might search for such an interpretive baseline in the early
state constitutions in effect during the Founding (as well as those in
effect soon after the adoption of the Constitution), 77 although this
73 See Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at
8-27.
74 See id. at 13-24.
75 See id. at 13 ("All three kinds of instruments were clearly understood presump-
tively to operate from their moment of effectiveness."); id. at 23 (" [W]ith respect to
every major governmental instrument that was available as a model in the late eight-
eenth century, the rule respecting effectiveness was the same: such instruments take
effect from the moment of their adoption unless there is some provision that says
otherwise.").
76 See id. at 13 ("[A]I1 three kinds of instruments were understood to be capable
of taking effect in stages, with different provisions generating legal effects at different
times."); id. at 23 ("Legal instruments need not be effective or ineffective in total at
any particular moment in time.").
77 Needless to say, early state constitutions in effect after the Founding deserve
less interpretive weight than those in effect during the Founding, although both may
well serve to illustrate the prevailing interpretive baseline at the Founding. Cf Steven
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method is surely not error-proof.78 It does, however, seem a logical
place to look. As Lawson and Seidman usefully document, the Fram-
ers used the early state constitutions to draft the Constitution, 79 and it
is fair to say that the Ratifiers used the same to understand it.80
It is not surprising that the early state constitutions addressed the
transition question. Indeed, to their credit, Lawson and Seidman pre-
sent most, if not all, of this evidence.81 They observe that "[o] ne com-
mon approach was to make express provision for the continuance in
office of existing public officials until the machinery of their new gov-
ernments was operative. '8 2
For example, the North Carolina Constitution of 1776 provided
that officials of the old regime would continue to exercise authority
after the new regime was adopted but before the new regime's offi-
cials would be put into place.8 3 They aptly refer to this transition rule
as one "'granting a continuance' to preexisting institutions."8 4 The
G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE
L.J. 541, 550-51 (1994) (questioning the legitimacy of relying on "the Constitution's
postenactment 'legislative' history").
78 See Lawson & Seidman, Wen Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at
15-16 (noting the limitations of using the early state constitutions as a source of con-
stitutional meaning); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 307 (James Madison) (Clin-
ton Rossiter ed., 1961) (similar).
The use of the early state constitutions to squeeze meaning from the Constitution
is an interpretivist/originalist technique that deserves to be explicated by someone in
a separate essay. Generally, the technique is one of many "intertextual" techniques.
More specifically, the technique is a sort of comparative constitutional law, but one
frozen in the late eighteenth-century. Cf Akhil Reed Amar, Comparative Constitu-
tional Law, American Style (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (us-
ing old and modern state constitutions to interpret the Constitution).
79 See Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at
15 & nn.60-61; see also MAx FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 128-29 (1913) (stating that in the drafting of the Constitution at the
Philadelphia Convention "the state constitutions were continually drawn upon").
80 References to the early State Constitutions abound in important Founding-era
materials such as the public writings of the Federalists and Anti-Federalists and the
recorded debates of the several State ratifying conventions. For a classic exposition,
see THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 78, at 303-08 Uames Madison) (surveying the
early State constitutions in discussing the separation of powers).
81 See Lawson & Seidman, VWien Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at
15-21.
82 Id. at 17.
83 See N.C. CONST. of 1776, coda ("This Constitution is not intended to preclude
the present Congress from making a temporary provision, for the well ordering of this
State, until the General Assembly shall establish government, agreeable to the mode
herein before described.").
84 Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at 18.
2002]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
influential Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 contained a similar, but
considerably more prolix provision,8 5 and this provision was essen-
tially copied in the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784.86 Lawson
and Seidman also report that the Delaware Constitution of 1776,7 the
South Carolina Constitution of 1778,88 and the Virginia Constitution
of 177689 "also expressly provided for the continuation in office of
various officials until new elections were held under the new constitu-
tions."90 The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 also contained an
elaborate transition provision providing that the old regime's execu-
tive and judicial (but not legislative) officials continue to exercise au-
thority until a given date after the new regime's adoption.91
Interestingly, at least some of the transition rules of these early
state constitutions were not gapless: the old regime continued to exer-
cise authority after the new regime's adoption but before the new re-
gime's elections were held; the old regime did not continue to
exercise authority up to the point in time where the new regime's
officials came into office. Put differently, the early state constitutions
85 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided:
To the end there may be no failure of justice, or danger arise to the com-
monwealth from a change of the form of government, all officers, civil and
military, holding commissions under the government and people of Massa-
chusetts Bay in New England, and all other officers of the said government
and people, at the time this constitution shall take effect, shall have, hold,
use, exercise, and enjoy, all the powers and authority to them granted or
committed, until other persons shall be appointed in their stead; and all
courts of law shall proceed in the execution of the business of their respec-
tive departments; and all the executive and legislative officers, bodies, and
powers, shall continue in full force, in the enjoyment and exercise of all
their trusts, employments, and authority; until the general court, and the
supreme and executive officers under this constitution, are designated and
invested with their respective trusts, powers, and authority.
MAss. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. VI, art. IX.
86 The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 provided:
To the end that there may be no failure ofjustice or danger arise to this state
from a change in the form of government, all civil and military officers,
holding commissions under the government and people of New Hampshire,
and other officers of the said government and people, at the time this consti-
tution shall take effect, shall hold, exercise and enjoy all the powers and
authorities to them granted and committed, until other persons shall be ap-
pointed in their stead.
N.H. CONsT. of 1784, pt. II, para. 84.
87 DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 27.
88 S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. II.
89 VA. CONST. of 1776, paras. 11, 14.
90 Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at 18.
91 PA. CONST. of 1790, scheds. §§ 2-4.
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contemplated some interregnum, just less than one that would exist in
the absence of the transition rule.92
What do Lawson and Seidman make of this evidence from the
early state constitutions regarding the transition question? According
to Lawson and Seidman:
All of these provisions made sense only on the assumption that pre-
existing governmental institutions had authority only to the extent that
such authority was recognized by the new constitutions. And that, in turn,
assumes that the new constitutions were, to the extent possible, op-
erative from the moment of their adoption.93
The italicized language-language emphasized by Lawson and
Seidman-is the interpretive baseline from the early state constitu-
tions on the transition question. In the absence of a provision grant-
ing the old regime's institutions authority in the period following the
new regime's adoption but before the new regime is fully effective, the
old regime's institutions have no authority. So say the early state con-
stitutions and those Founders who would read them. The interpretive
baseline on the transition question does suggest Lawson and Seid-
man's conclusion that "the new constitutions were, to the extent possi-
ble, operative from the moment of their adoption. '9 4 So far, so good.
Lawson and Seidman then discuss a different provision in the
NewJersey Constitution of 1776 (among others) specifically granting
continuing effect to the old regime's laws in the new regime to the
extent not incompatible with the new regime and "until altered" by
the new regime's legislature. 95 Recall that the Supremacy Clause, in
92 This conclusion is not completely inescapable. One could argue (desperately,
in my view) that the transition rules specified by these state constitutions providing
for the old regime's continuance in the period between the new regime's adoption
and the new regime's elections simply displaced a baseline of the old regime's contin-
uance in the period between the new regime's adoption and the new regime's
officeholding.
93 Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at 18.
94 Id.
95 The NewJersey Constitution of 1776 provided:
[A]I1 the laws of this Province . . .shall be and remain in full force, until
altered by the Legislature of this Colony (such only excepted, as are incom-
patible with this Charter) and shall be, according as heretofore, regarded in
all respects, by all civil officers, and others, the good people of this Province.
NJ. CONST. of 1776, art. XXI.
Other early state constitutions contained similar provisions. See MAss. CONST. of
1780, part II, ch. VI, art. VI ("All the laws which have heretofore been adopted, used
and approved in the Province, Colony or State of Massachusetts Bay, and usually prac-
tised on in the courts of law, shall remain and be in full force."); N.Y. CONST. of 1777,
art. XXXV (stating that English common and statutory law, as well as acts of the New
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contrast, does not by negative implication make the Confederation
Congress's laws the law of the land under the Constitution.9 6 The
New Jersey Constitution of 1776 did not also provide for a transition
provision similar to the ones discussed above.97 Lawson and Seidman
then ask the pertinent question whether "[i]n states like NewJersey
that did not expressly provide for the continuation in office of pre-
constitutional authorities, did the rule of immediate operation instan-
taneously wipe out the existing governmental authorities, even before
the new institutions were in place?"98
They answer "obviously no,"99 an answer that is downright surpris-
ing given their conclusion just a page earlier in their article that "[a] 11
of these provisions made sense only on the assumption that preexist-
ing governmental institutions had authority only to the extent that such
authority was recognized by the new constitutions."'0 0 They offer two expla-
nations, although they claim that their answer "can be reached
through several lines of reasoning."'' 1
The first explanation is that "one could say that a reference to 'all
the laws' that remain in effect under the new constitution includes
laws concerning governmental structure." 102 In saying so, Lawson and
Seidman seem to be concerned with the old regime's ability to put the
new regime into place-by specifying, for example, the date and time
of elections for the new regime's officials. Elsewhere, they refer to the
"transitional action by the preexisting authorities." 3 The fact that
the old regime retains authority to put the new regime into place does
not mean that the old regime retains other governmental authority.
Any of the old regime's authority to put the new regime into place is
York colonial legislature through April 19, .1775, "shall be and continue the law of this
State"); S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXIX ("the resolutions of this or any former con-
gress of this colony, and all laws now of force here, (and not hereby altered,) shall so
continue until altered or repealed"). These provisions, when read in conjunction
with the Supremacy Clause, reinforce the conclusion derived from negative implica-
tion that the Supremacy Clause does not make the Confederation Congress's laws the
law of the land under the Constitution. This conclusion is, of course, not completely
inescapable. One could argue that these provisions granting continuing effect to the
old regime's laws to the extent not incompatible with the new regime are merely
declaratory and clarifying. Cf Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Redundancies and Clari-
fying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1998).
96 See supra text accompanying note 62.
97 See supra text accompanying notes 81-91.
98 Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at 19.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 18.
101 Id. at 19.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 21.
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derived from the new regime, not the old regime. In the instant con-
text, one could say that the Constitution granted the Confederation
Congress authority to put the Constitution into place, and that the
Constitution otherwise prohibited the Confederation Congress from
exercising any governmental authority under the Articles of
Confederation. 104
The second explanation is that "one could say that the continua-
tion of the existing authorities was implicit in the new constitution,
even without an express provision preserving their authority."10 5 One
could say this. As Lawson and Seidman put it, in the absence of an
express transition provision, "it would not be bizarre to say that the
new constitution implicitly retained the existing governmental institu-
tions until their replacements had taken office. 10 6 But one could also
say the opposite. It would not be bizarre to say that the new constitu-
tion contemplated an interregnum. The question is less whether it
would be bizarre and more whether it is the best reading of such a
state constitution to conclude that the old regime had continuing au-
thority until the new regime became fully effective.
How do Lawson and Seidman interpret the evidence from the
state constitutions in reading the Constitution? Consider the reason-
ing of Lawson and Seidman on this crucial question:
Although the Constitution could have expressly provided for a tran-
sitional period, as did many of the contemporaneous state constitu-
tions, its failure to do so poses no great problem for originalist
textualists.... It is clear that the Constitution, even without saying
so expressly, contemplates that its provisions for legislative and ex-
ecutive action do not take effect until appropriate steps have been
taken to put the new government into place. This also means that
the preexisting authorities, such as the institutions created by the
Articles of Confederation, were not immediately displaced by ratifi-
cation of the new Constitution. The machinery of the old regime
could continue until the machinery of the new regime was in
place. 10 7
Given the entirety of the evidence, it is befuddling that Lawson
and Seidman conclude that the Constitution, once adopted, did not
(as opposed to merely could not) displace the Congress under the
Articles of Confederation. The fact that the Constitution's provisions
for legislative and executive (and for that matter, judicial) action were
104 See also supra note 42.
105 Lawson and Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at
19-20.
106 Id. at 20.
107 See id. at 23-24.
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not "fully" effective until legislative and executive (and judicial) per-
sonnel were in place has no bearing on the transition question in and
of itself. We need an interpretive baseline. It is here that their answer
to the transition question is most vulnerable. Their conclusion that
the transition was gapless is seriously under-motivated by their own
evidence. Indeed, the evidence from the early state constitutions sug-
gests that the better answer (though by no means an absolutely unas-
sailable one) is that in the absence of a transition rule, there is an
interregnum between the old regime and the new regime.
As a matter of Lawson and Seidman's extra-textual evidence and
their inferences from the Constitution's text and structure, it remains
possible that the transition between the Articles of Confederation and
the Constitution was gapless and that it was not gapless. In order to
resolve the transition question, we must look to additional evidence
not marshaled by Lawson and Seidman. To this additional evidence, I
now turn.
IV. ADDITIONAL EXTRA-TEXTUAL EVIDENCE
ON THE TRANSITION QUESTION
In this part, I offer additional extra-textual evidence on the transi-
tion question. This evidence enables a more complete analysis of the
transition question. The evidence is presented in three chunks: the
public writings of the Federalists and Anti-Federalists, the secret draft-
ing history of the Constitution, and the journals of the Confederation
Congress.
A. Reading the Public Writings of the Federalists and Anti-Federalists
The public writings of the Federalists and Anti-Federalists are a
good-even very good-extra-textual source of constitutional mean-
ing. 11 There is, unfortunately, little in those writings that sheds light
on the transition question. But there is a little. In The Federalist No.
43, James Madison introduced and discussed Article VII. Again, Arti-
cle VII provides that "[t]he Ratification of the Conventions of nine
States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution
between the States so ratifying the Same." 0 9
108 See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty &Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425, 1498 n.285
(1987); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional
Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1342-45 (1998); David McGowan, Ethos in
Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, and the Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L.
REv. 755, 819-39 (2001).
109 U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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"This article," said Madison, "speaks for itself."1 10 He quickly
made clear why Article VII requires the participation of the people
through conventions and why Article VII requires less than all of the
original thirteen States to establish the Constitution. 1 ' Madison then
asked two questions. First, "On what principle the Confederation,
which stands in the solemn form of a compact among the States, can
be superseded without the unanimous consent of the parties to it?"112
Second, "What relation is to subsist between the nine or more States
ratifying the Constitution, and the remaining few who do not become
parties to it?"113
The first question essentially asked whether the adoption of the
Constitution was legal or not, which is also the subject of an ongoing
debate between Professors Ackerman and Amar, 114 and well beyond
the subject of this Essay. The second question, however, does bear (a
little) on the transition question. How so, you ask?
Madison was plainly positing that some States would not be part
of the new Union . . . at least for some period of time, but probably
not forever.'1 5 All of the thirteen States were, of course, a part of the
110 THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 70, at 279 (James Madison).
111 See id.
The express authority of the people alone could give due validity to the Con-
stitution. To have required the unanimous ratification of the thirteen States,
would have subjected the essential interests of the whole to the caprice or
corruption of a single member. It would have marked a want of foresight in





114 See supra note 19 (discussing this debate).
115 The original Constitution openly reflects this expectation. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 2, cl. 3 ("[A]nd until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hamp-
shire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Provi-
dence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, NewJersey four, Pennsylvania
eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina
five, and Georgia three."). The Framers and Ratifiers also believed that all thirteen
States would likely be a part of the new Union. For the Framers' reflections, see, for
example, 2 RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 565 (preamble of draft of
Constitution referred to the Committee of Style) ("We the People of the States of
New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecti-
cut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Caro-
lina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare and establish the following
Constitution for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity."). For other reflec-
tions, see, for example, THE FEDERALIST Nos. 9, 11-13 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos.
10, 14 (James Madison). But cf 2 RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 469
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Articles of Confederation, a point made explicit by its preamble. 116
Although Madison was admittedly not addressing the specific question
of transition, he was impliedly addressing the general question of the
relationship between the old and new regimes. Madison answered the
second question thus:
The second question is not less delicate; and the flattering prospect
of its being merely hypothetical forbids an over-curious discussion
of it. It is one of those cases which must be left to provide for itself.
In general, it may be observed that although no political relation can subsist
between the assenting and dissenting States, yet the moral relations will re-
main uncanceled. The claims ofjustice, both on one side and on the
other, will be in force, and must be fulfilled; the rights of humanity
must in all cases be duly and mutually respected; whilst considera-
tions of a common interest, and, above all, the remembrance of the
endearing scenes which are past, and the anticipation of a speedy
triumph over the obstacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in
vain Moderation on one side, and Prudence on the other. 117
Madison was quite content to sidestep the tough questions of Ar-
ticle VII. The italicized language strongly suggests that the political
relation represented by the Articles of Confederation, composed of
assenting and dissenting States, could not govern the political relation
represented by the Constitution, at least in the absence of any expres-
sion to the contrary. And common sense suggests that it would be
very odd (though perhaps not absolutely unthinkable) for the Con-
federation Congress, representing all of the original thirteen States, to
have transitional authority for (potentially) less than all of the original
thirteen States. Any theory of transition must take this possibility into
account. We shall revisit this commonsensical point in short order.'1 8
B. Reading the Secret Drafting History of the Constitution
Another good extra-textual source of constitutional meaning-
and as we shall soon see, one that is particularly insightful in the in-
stant context-is the secret drafting history of the Constitution from
(remarks ofJohn Dickinson) (discussing precursor to Article VII and asking "whether
the refusing States in the Confederacy could be deserted").
116 SeeARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION pmbl. (U.S. 1781) ("Articles of Confederation
and perpetual Union between the States of Newhampshire, Massachusetts-bay, Rhode
island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina and Georgia.").
117 THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 70, at 280 (James Madison) (emphasis
added).
118 See infra Part V.
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the Philadelphia Convention of 1787.119 The drafting evolution of
and the debates surrounding the three provisions of the Constitution
canvassed in Part II-Article VII, the Supremacy Clause, and the En-
gagements Clause-may reveal something about the assumptions in-
herent in those provisions with respect to the Constitution's adoption
and effective dates.
Nowhere do Lawson and Seidman mention the secret drafting
history of the Constitution in the course of their article. This may be
an indication that there is little in the Philadelphia records of proba-
tive value, or an indication that the Philadelphia records are not ad-
missible or relevant sources of constitutional meaning-or less
charitably, an oversight. Putting the interpretive force of the Philadel-
phia records as a whole to the side for the moment, it is worth check-
ing to see what in fact the Philadelphia records do reveal.
The secret drafting history of the Engagements Clause provides
some very interesting clues as to how the Framers thought about the
questions of the Constitution's adoption and effective dates while
drafting the Constitution. The starting point for our inquiry is Resolu-
tion 15 of the Committee of the Whole House, proposed sometime
around June 13.120 That resolution provided that:
Resolved. that provision ought to be made for the continuance of
Congress and their authorities until a given day after the reform of
the articles of Union shall be adopted; and for the completion of all
their engagements.12
There is no question that Resolution 15 was concerned with the
Confederation Congress and not the Congress under the Constitu-
tion. The "first clause" of Resolution 15 provided that the Confedera-
tion Congress ought to be continued after the Constitution's adoption
date but some time before the date the first Congress under the Con-
stitution was to convene. Importantly, this clause did not envision that
the Confederation Congress should continue to sit up to the date the
first Congress under the Constitution was to convene, but only to
some time before then-hence, the reference to a "given day." In
other words, this clause did envision some gap between the Confeder-
ation Congress and the Congress under the Constitution, just less of
one than would otherwise exist in the absence of the clause. The "sec-
119 The role of the secret drafting history of the Constitution in constitutional
interpretation is the subject of a forthcoming article. See Vasan Kesavan & Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO.
L.J. (forthcoming 2003).
120 See 1 REcORDs OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 231, 237.
121 1 id. at 231 (footnote omitted).
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ond clause" of Resolution 15 clarified the scope of the "first clause"
and made clear that Resolution 15 extended to the completion of the
Confederation Congress's engagements as well.
Less than a week later, the Framers as a whole took up Resolution
15. Their short debate is worth considering carefully. Only three
Framers spoke on the resolution. The first person to speak on the
resolution was Gouverneur Morris. The records show that Morris
"thought [that] the assumption of their engagements might as well be
omitted; and that Congs. ought not to be continued till all the States
should adopt the reform; since it may become expedient to give effect
to it whenever a certain number of States shall adopt it."122
Morris's opening statement that "the assumption of their engage-
ments might as well be omitted"-a reference to the second clause of
Resolution 15-may be taken to mean that it is unnecessary to specify
the second clause given the first clause of Resolution 15. Admittedly,
the meaning of this opening statement is not entirely clear, but for
present purposes, it is the remainder of Morris's remarks that are of
importance. His statement that "Congs. ought not to be continued till
all the States should adopt the reform; since it may become expedient
to give effect to it whenever a certain number of States shall adopt it"
squarely presents the key issue. Morris makes clear that the Confeder-
ation Congress ought not to be continued from the date of the propo-
sal of the Constitution to the date of adoption of the Constitution by
all thirteen States because it may become expedient to give effect to
"the reform" (that is, the Constitution) after a certain number of
States shall have adopted it (bear in mind that Morris's statement was
made before the substance of Article VII was agreed to). 1 23 Morris
takes it as a given that tie Confederation Congress ought not to be
continued after the date the Constitution shall have been adopted but
before the date the first Congress under the Constitution was to con-
vene. Morris thus clearly envisioned a gap between the two regimes of
the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution. Morris's state-
ment also addresses in part the question of the Constitution's adop-
tion and effective dates. His statement makes use of the word "adopt"
as in adoption and the word "effect" as in effective, suggesting that the
adoption date and the effective date are indeed different.
The second person to speak was James Madison. According to
Madison, "the clause can mean nothing more than that provision
ought to be made for preventing an interregnum; which must exist in
122 2 id. at 46-47.




the interval between the adoption of the New Govt. and the com-
mencement of its operation, if the old Govt. should cease on the first
of these events."1 24 In explaining the purpose of the clause, Madison
hits the nail on its head. The purpose of Resolution 15 was obviously
to provide for the continuation of the Confederation Congress after
the Constitution's adoption date but before the date the first Con-
gress under the Constitution was to convene. Indeed, Madison's use
of the word "interregnum" is significant. An interregnum is "the pe-
riod of time between the end of a sovereign's reign and the accession
of a successor," a point made apparent by the word's Latin roots inter-
for "between" and regnum for "reign."1 25 Madison seems to be saying
that an interregnum would exist in the absence of Resolution 15. This
is fully in accord with the historical baselines of constitutions, statutes,
and treaties that Lawson and Seidman so carefully set forth. 126
Madison also seems to be saying that an interregnum would be unde-
sirable. His response to Gouverneur Morris reads as if he were saying,
"Gouverneur, you are over-reading Resolution 15. The resolution
does little more than prevent an interregnum, and there is nothing
undesirable about that."
The third and final Framer to speak on Resolution 15 was James
Wilson. The records show that he "did not entirely approve of the
manner in which the clause relating to the engagements of Congs. was
expressed; but he thought [that] some provision on the subject [of
engagements] would be proper in order to prevent any suspicion that
the obligations of the Confederacy might be dissolved along with the
Governt. under which they were contracted." 127 Wilson was con-
cerned with the second clause of Resolution 15, and that some provi-
sion would be made respecting the engagements of the
Confederation Congress. That some provision would be the Engage-
ments Clause, proposed in substantially its final form and agreed to by
the Framers on August 22-23, 1787.128 Wilson's statement has no pro-
bative value on the key issue of the transition between the two regimes
of the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution.
After these three statements, the records show that the Framers as
a whole took up "the question on the 1st part-relating to [the] con-
tinuance of Congs." 29 The recorded vote was three States for and six
124 2 id. at 47.
125 SeeWEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1132 (1986).
126 See supra Part III.
127 2 RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 47.
128 See 2 id. at 377, 392.
129 2 id. at 47.
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States against, and so clause 1 of Resolution 15 was disagreed to.130
The records also show that the second clause "as to completion of
their engagements" was disagreed to without discussion. 13 1
What does the secret drafting history of the Constitution mean?
This is an easy question. The Framers did consider the question of
whether the Confederation Congress ought to be continued after the
Constitution's adoption date but before the date the first Congress
under the Constitution was to convene, and they expressly rejected a
resolution that would have mostly prevented an interregnum between
the two regimes of the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution.
Although the text is capable of supporting Lawson and Seidman's the-
ory of gapless transition between the two regimes as well as an alterna-
tive theory of an interregnum between the two regimes, the secret
drafting history of the Constitution is only capable of supporting the
latter. Had Lawson and Seidman read the foregoing secret drafting
history of the Constitution, they would have at least been forced to
openly acknowledge the possibility of a transition gap between the two
regimes.
What weight should the secret drafting history of the Constitution
have in this debate? This is a huge question. I will only mark the fault
lines, leaving to another day a more full discussion of the role of the
secret drafting history of the Constitution in constitutional interpreta-
tion. 132 There are three main possibilities: (1) the use and use-fruits
of the Philadelphia records are inadmissible;' 33 (2) the use of the
Philadelphia records is inadmissible, but the use-fruits are admissible;
and (3) the use and use-fruits of the Philadelphia records are
admissible.
Professor Lawson believes that the Philadelphia records are gen-
erally weak evidence of constitutional meaning,'3 4 but it is not entirely
clear whether he would exclude the Philadelphia records from an
"original public meaning"' 35 inquiry into constitutional meaning. In
130 See 2 id.
131 See2 id.
132 See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 119.
133 Cf Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972) (interpreting the Self
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment and holding that when forcing B to
testify in A's case, the government can not use B's testimony, or any fruits derived
from the testimony, in any later criminal case against B).
134 See E-mail from Gary Lawson, Professor, Boston University School of Law, to
Vasan Kesavan (Jan. 1, 2002) (on file with author).
135 Professor Lawson has popularized the use of the phrase. See, e.g., Gary Lawson,
On Reading Recipes .. .And Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1826-34 (1997); Gary
Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 859, 875 (1992). The meaning of the
phrase is the subject of a forthcoming article, see Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 119,
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other work, Professors Lawson and Seidman do consult the secret
drafting history of the Constitution.13 6 If one believes that the use
and use-fruits of the Philadelphia records are admissible, as I do, then
the question is how we should consider the secret drafting history of
the Constitution with respect to the entirety of evidence that Lawson
and Seidman and I muster.
It is here that there is a good case for giving the secret drafting
history of the Constitution some significant weight. The other evi-
dence is threadbare on the specific issue of the transition between the
two regimes. In the absence of' other extra-textual evidence of consti-
tutional meaning such as history or constitutional structure on the
specific issue of the transition between the two regimes, the secret
drafting history of the Constitution would seem to be an especially
good source of constitutional meaning. Would not the Framers' sub-
jective understanding of the drafting of the Engagements Clause bear
on the meaning of the text of the Constitution itself?
Moreover, the arrow from the secret drafting history points in the
same direction as the arrows from Lawson and Seidman's review of
constitutions, statutes, and treaties: as of the date of the adoption of
the new regime, the old regime is dead, unless otherwise specified. As
a matter of interpretive baselines, the secret drafting history of the
but may be summarized for present purposes by the following statement by Oliver
Wendell Holmes concerning statutory interpretation:
[A statute] does not disclose one meaning conclusively according to the laws
of language. Thereupon we ask, not what this man meant, but what those
words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them
in the circumstances in which they were used.... But the normal speaker of
English is merely a special variety, a literary form, so to speak, of our old
friend the prudent man. He is external to the particular writer, and a refer-
ence to him as the criterion is simply another instance of the externality of
the law .... We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what
the statute means.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv. 417, 417-19
(1899).
136 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial
Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 206 & n.64 (2001); Gary Lawson & Chris-
topher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IowA L. REV.
1267, 1309 & n.198 (1996); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of
Federal Power: AJurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 293 &
n.108 (1993). In addition, Professor Lawson also believes that early precedents inter-
preting the Constitution are "surely admissible," see Lawson, supra, at 215 n.84, and it
would seem to follow that the secret drafting history of the Constitution is also surely
admissible (after all, both were "invisible" to the Ratifiers).
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Engagements Clause confirms that the Confederation Congress was a
legal nullity after the Constitution's adoption. 37
C. Reading the Journals of the Confederation Congress
One final extra-textual source of constitutional meaning for this
Essay is precedent. 138 So what did the Confederation Congress do af-
ter June 21, 1788, and before March 4, 1789? And is that good evi-
dence of whether there was an interregnum between the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution or not?
During the transition period, the Confederation Congress took
some actions with respect to implementing the Constitution. Lawson
and Seidman correctly point out that the Confederation Congress
took no action with respect to setting the times, places, or manner of
holding elections for Senators or Representatives because the States
could take such action on their own. 139 They also correctly point out
137 In their reply, Lawson and Seidman downplay the importance of the "mental
states" of James Madison, Governeur Morris, and James Wilson, as well as Resolution
15 of the Committee of the Whole House. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 48, at
91-93. I wholeheartedly agree with Lawson and Seidman that "mental states" are
"evidence of meaning" and "not constitutive of meaning." Id. at 91. They usefully set
forth three standards for evaluating whether mental states are good evidence of
meaning: "if they were formed by someone who (1) considered all of the relevant
arguments, (2) was capable of synthesizing all of the relevant arguments, and (3) was
unlikely to be unduly influenced by various biases that would interfere with sound
processing of the evidence." Id. at 92. They then almost casually assert that "there is
simply no reason to think that the expressions of which we have a record meet these
criteria." Id. at 92-93. If the direct acknowledgment of the transition question in
Resolution 15 of the Committee of the Whole House, the informed discussion and
debate among three Framers, and the decision by the Framers in light of this discus-
sion and debate to reject Resolution 15 do not satisfy Lawson and Seidman's three
standards for evaluating mental states, then I find it most difficult to imagine what
mental states would be good evidence of meaning.
138 For some thoughts on the proper role of precedent in an original public-mean-
ing approach to constitutional interpretation, see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 291, 380-83 (2002); and
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 119. For some thoughts on the proper role of prece-
dent in constitutional interpretation more generally, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Su-
preme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REv. 26
(2000); and Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. PoL'v 23 (1994).
139 See Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at
10-11. Lawson and Seidman noted,
The Constitution itself prescribed the qualifications for electors for the
House and Senate, and the states were empowered to set their own times
and places for congressional elections. Thus, the states could provide en-
tirely for the election of members of the new Congress without any help
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that the Confederation Congress "legislated"'140 on or about Septem-
ber 13, 1788, with respect to the time of choosing Presidential elec-
tors141 and the choice of a location for the seat of the new federal
government. 142 These administrative actions were taken pursuant to
the resolution accompanying the Constitution sent by the Philadel-
phia Convention to the Confederation Congress. 143 These actions
were perhaps taken pursuant to the spirit or intention but not the
letter of the Constitution, since the resolution accompanying the Con-
stitution is not a part of the Constitution itself.' 44 These actions were
from the Confederation Congress. Accordingly, the [Philadelphia] Conven-
tion did not request, and the Confederation Congress did not provide, any
machinery for implementing the constitutional directives on congressional
elections.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Cf U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places, and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.").
140 See Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at
12.
141 See 34 JouRNALs, supra note 49, at 515-19; cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3
("The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on
which they shall give their votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United
States."). 1
142 See 34 JouRNA~s, supra note 49, at 515-19, 521-23. These two actions were
taken only after many failed attempts to do so, given disagreement over the seat of the
new federal government. For the many failed attempts, see 34 id. at 358-60, 367-68,
383-88, 392-404, 415-19, 455-57, 481-84, 487-88, 495-97.
143 2 RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 665. The resolution
provided,
Resolved,
That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that as soon as the Conventions of
nine States shall have ratified this Constitution, the United States in Con-
gress assembled should fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by
the States which shall have ratified the same, and a Day on which the Elec-
tors should assemble to vote for the President, and the Time and place for
commencing Proceedings under this Constitution.
2 id.
Interestingly, a similarly worded resolution was part of the draft Constitution submit-
ted by the Framers to the Committee of Style and Arrangement, see 2 id. at 579 (arts.
XXII, XXIII), but was removed from the body of the Constitution by that Committee.
144 It is not necessary to conclude that these administrative actions of the Confed-
eration Congress were taken pursuant to the Constitution; if not constitutional, these
actions were extra-constitutional, but not unconstitutional. Moreover, if the Confed-
eration Congress had not taken such actions, one could well imagine that some repre-
sentative body comprised of the States that had ratified the Constitution would have
been able to take these basic steps to put the whole Constitution into effect. Cf Law-
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most certainly not taken pursuant to the Articles of Confederation,
and hence shed no light on the transition question.' 45
The question that remains is what did the Confederation Con-
gress do during the transition period other than the foregoing admin-
istrative actions. Lawson and Seidman do not discuss any of this
history. The starting point for this inquiry is the Journals of the Conti-
nental Congress.
We begin with the events of early July, 1788. The Confederation
Congress learned of New Hampshire's all-important ninth ratification
on or aboutJuly 2, 1788.146 One important item was then on the Con-
federation Congress's agenda: the admission of Kentucky into the
Union as an independent State.14 7 Kentucky was then, of course, a
part of Virginia. Virginia had granted her consent to Kentucky's state-
hood in the form of enabling acts. The Second Enabling Act-the
operative enabling act at the time-required that the Confederation
Congress admit Kentucky into the Union by July 4, 1788. The Com-
mittee of the Whole of the Confederation Congress reported that
Kentucky be admitted into the Union pursuant to the Articles of Con-
son & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at 11 (discussing
the Confederation Congress's choice of a date for the first meeting of the Electoral
College) ("Perhaps it would have been possible for the states to agree among them-
selves on a uniform date for the presidential election through some vehicle other
than the Confederation Congress, but the preexisting Congress was the obvious locus
for that choice.").
145 In their reply, Lawson and Seidman attach too much importance to the resolu-
tion accompanying the Constitution as an "official resolution of the Constitutional
Convention as whole" that the Confederation Congress would continue to exist as a
legal entity after the adoption of the Constitution. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note
48, at 96. The fact that the Confederation Congress was thought by the Philadelphia
Convention to exist for a very limited purpose of fixing dates (and a place) under the
Constitution says nothing about the Confederation Congress's continuing legal au-
thority under the Articles during the transition period, even though the resolution re-
fers to the same "United States in Congress assembled" as in the Articles of
Confederation. Lawson and Seidman recognize that perhaps the Confederation Con-
gress "only had the authority to issue non-binding pronouncements," but reject that
possibility as "unlikely." Id. at 97. If they are correct, it is most certainly not because
of the resolution accompanying the Constitution. Indeed, if we are to attach any
importance to this resolution, its limited scope and negative implication strongly sug-
gest the opposite conclusion, especially when we remember the rejection of a propo-
sal by the same Framers as a whole to grant the Confederation Congress a
"continuance" after the adoption of the Constitution. See supra text accompanying
notes 121, 129-30.
146 See 8 DHRC, supra note 9, at xxi; 34 JOURNALS, supra note 141, at 281.
147 For a short summary of the Kentucky statehood movement, see Kesavan &
Paulsen, supra note 138, at 375-78.
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federation, 148 and just one day before the operative enabling act was
to expire (and only a day after the Confederation Congress learned of
the Constitution's adoption), the Confederation Congress considered
the issue of Kentucky's statehood. What did they say?
Resolved... that the said Legislature and the inhabitants of the dis-
trict aforesaid [Kentucky] be informed, that as the constitution of
the United States is now ratified, Congress think it unadviseable [sic]
to adopt any further measures for admitting the district of Kentucky
into the federal Union as an independent member thereof under the
Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union; but that Congress think-
ing it expedient that the said district be made a separate State and
member of the Union as soon after proceedings shall commence
under the said constitution as circumstances shall permit, recom-
mend it to the said legislature and to the inhabitants of the said
district so to alter their acts and resolutions relative to the premisses
[sic] as to render them conformable to the provisions made in the
said constitution to the End that no impediment may be in the way
of the speedy accomplishment of this important business. 149
Thus, the Confederation Congress voted to delay the admission
of Kentucky into the Union. Why they did so is not entirely clear. The
italicized language in the resolution indicates that the Confederation
Congress thought that it would be "unadviseable" but not necessarily
"unlawful" to admit Kentucky into the Union. The remainder of the
italicized language suggests a stronger point: the Confederation Con-
gress could only admit Kentucky into the Union "under the Articles of
Confederation." It seemed clear that the Confederation Congress
could not admit Kentucky into the Union "under the Constitution."
The Kentucky precedent is important because it was the very first
event during the transition period to implicitly resolve the legal status
of the Articles of Confederation. The best interpretation of the Ken-
tucky precedent, I submit, is that the Confederation Congress lacked
power to admit new States into the Union during the transition pe-
148 See 34 JouRNALs, supra note 141, at 194. The Committee reported,
That in their opinion it is expedient that the district of Kentucky be erected
into an independent state and therefore they submit the following resolu-
tion, That the address and resolutions from the district of Kentucky with the
acts of the legislature of Virginia therein specified be referred to a commit-
tee consisting of a member from each state, to prepare and report an act for
acceding to the independence of the said district of Kentucky and for receiv-
ing the same into the Union as a member thereof, in a mode conformable to
the Articles of Confederation.
34 id. (footnotes omitted).
149 34 id. at 293-94 (emphasis added).
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riod,150 although this interpretation is not absolutely required.151 If
the Confederation Congress lacked the power to admit new States
into the Union under the Articles of Confederation-a power ostensi-
150 For similar observations, see TEMPLE BODLEY, HISTORY OF KENTUCKY (BEFORE
THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE IN 1803) 433 (1928).
[A] resolution [was] adopted reciting that the ninth state had ratified the
Constitution, and therefore Congress was powerless to admit Kentucky into
the Federal Union, but that, as Congress believed it expedient that Kentucky
should be admitted, its inhabitants and Virginia should take steps to secure
admission to the Union under the new Constitution.
Id; see also id. ("Thus, by its own procrastination, Congress had made itself incapable
of receiving Kentucky into the Confederation, and the hope of separation was need-
lessly and indefinitely deferred."); id. at 435 ("[The Confederation Congress's] failure
to act on Kentucky's admission before the Confederation expired left the people of
the district facing complex problems of legal power and political expediency with
reference to their sorely-needed statehood."); id. ("Virtually, however, neither Con-
gress nor Confederation longer existed.").
For a contrary observation, see Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 9, at 523. Acker-
man and Katyal maintain that the Confederation Congress did not lack the power to
admit new States into the Union (presumably under the Articles of Confederation)
during the transition period. They offer two reasons. First, "[The Confederation]
Congress did not respond to the new situation by declaring itself legally incompetent,
but simply found further action inexpedient." Id. Second,
this was done over the opposition of the Virginia delegation-which wanted
a formal confirmation of its compact with Kentucky-even though Virginia
had already ratified the new Constitution. Rather than supposing that their
state's recent ratification was tantamount to a renunciation of the Articles,
the Virginians protested when their fellow congressmen found it "inexpedi-
ent" to push forward on so delicate a matter!
Id.
On the first reason, one may disagree as to the best interpretation of the Confed-
eration Congress's resolution. On the second reason, it is possible that the Virginians
were acting unconstitutionally in the summer of 1788-just as, according to Lawson
and Seidman, the Virginians acted unconstitutionally in the winter of 1788. Cf Law-
son & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at 35 n.126. In-
deed, Virginia's interpretation of the effect of the adoption of the Constitution on the
Confederation Congress's power to admit Kentucky into the Union (presumably
under the Articles of Confederation) may have been significantly biased-the Ken-
tucky statehood movement had dragged on for years and both Virginians and Ken-
tuckians were eager to bring the statehood movement to a conclusion.
151 In earlier work, I failed to acknowledge the possibility that the Confederation
Congress may have retained legal authority under the Articles of Confederation dur-
ing the transition period-thereby overreaching in the opposite direction of Lawson
and Seidman. See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 138, at 377 ("The Continental Con-
gress voted to delay the admission of Kentucky into the Union (remember that with
the adoption of the Constitution, the Continental Congress lacked legal authority
under the Articles of Confederation).").
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bly given by Article XI of the Articles of Confederation 152-it would
seem that the Confederation Congress would have lacked other pow-
ers under the Articles of Confederation. The Kentucky precedent
suggests that the Confederation Congress was legally defunct during
the transition period. Alternatively, one might maintain that the
power to admit new States into the Union-a power that goes to the
very essence of the structure of the Union-is special enough to be
treated in a different way than all other federal governmental powers.
On this reading, the Confederation Congress may not have had the
power to admit new States into the Union during the transition pe-
riod but may have retained all other powers under the Articles of
Confederation.
The Kentucky precedent notwithstanding, the Confederation
Congress addressed a number of other issues during the summer and
fall of 1788. The principal issues concerned financial affairs (e.g., req-
uisitions, foreign loans, copper coinage, and prize money), foreign
relations (e.g., negotiations with Spain concerning the navigation of
the Mississippi River, the reception and retirement of foreign minis-
ters, and the redemption of captives held in the Barbary States), the
western territory, military affairs (e.g., troops and supplies and the use
of federal troops in Pennsylvania), Indian affairs, and postal affairs
(e.g., post routes and mails and mail contracts). 153 This activity does
suggest that the Confederation Congress continued to be legally oper-
ative under the Articles of Confederation during the transition
period.
What is most interesting about the Kentucky precedent and the
other activities of the Confederation Congress during the transition
period is the participation of the non-ratifying States-North Carolina
and Rhode Island-and for almost all of July, the participation of an-
other then-non-ratifying State, New York. 154 The key issue that in-
volved the participation of the non-ratifying States pertained to
152 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XI (U.S. 1781) ("Canada acceding to this
confederation, and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted
into, and entitled to all the advantages of this Union: but no other colony shall be
admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States.").
153 See 34 JouRNALS, supra note 141, at iii-iv, viii. Ackerman and Katyal state,
[The Confederation Congress] examined the prospect of new Dutch loans,
continued the Spanish negotiations, negotiated with the Indians, and pur-
sued other diplomatic issues. On the home front, it considered a new requi-
sition, devised new procedures for the survey and distribution of western
lands, and dispatched federal troops to quell disturbances in Pennsylvania.
Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 9, at 521 (citations omitted).
154 New York ratified the Constitution on July 20, 1788. See supra note 9. For
examples of non-ratifying States voting on matters pertaining to the organization of
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implementing the Constitution: the choice of a location for the seat of
the new federal government. 155 The obvious choices were Philadel-
phia or New York, and it was only after a fierce struggle between Fed-
eralists and Anti-Federalists that New York was selected as the seat of
the new federal government. The non-ratifying States helped to make
the difference in the selection of New York as the nation's next capi-
tol: "Federalists were often busy lobbying these nonratifying states in
order to win the capitol for their favorite city."1 56
These Federalists hoped to have their cake and eat it too. On
August 6, 1788, Alexander Hamilton proposed that the votes by dele-
gates from non-ratifying States shall not be "construed directly or indi-
rectly to imply either on their part or on the part of the states which
they represent an approbation of the constitution aforesaid or of any
part thereof or any manner or kind of obligation on the part of any
such state .... ,,157 The original resolution provided that "the Dele-
gates of [North Carolina and Rhode Island] have thought fit to vote
upon the said ordinance in virtue of the right of suffrage vested in
them by the Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union .... 158
All of this seems a little odd. The delegates of the Confederation Con-
gress at the time seemed to recognize how strange it was for the non-
ratifying States to participate in transitional matters relating to the
Constitution. Transitional matters aside, it remains possible that the
Confederation Congress was legally operative under the Articles of
Confederation as to other (non-transitional) matters.
Consider also the views of Alexander Hamilton. On August 12,
1788, Hamilton wrote a very interesting letter to Jeremiah Olney, a
delegate to the Confederation Congress from Rhode Island, discuss-
ing the participation of the non-ratifying States on the important tran-
sitional matter that remained. Hamilton wrote in relevant part:
A doubt might perhaps be raised about your right to a vote under
the present circumstances. There is not a member of Congress but
one who has even pretended to call your right in question. 'Tis
agreed generally that the power of organising the government is
given by the ratifying states to the United States in Congress assem-
bled, who are mere agents under a special authority and therefore
the non adopting states stand on the same footing with the adopt-
ing. Nor can the exercise of that right operate in any manner upon
the new federal government under the Constitution, see Ackerman & Katyal, supra
note 9, at 524 n.146 (citing sources).
155 See supra note 142.
156 Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 9, at 524.
157 See 34 JOURNALS, supra note 141, at 403-04.
158 34 id. at 403 n.2.
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your situation. If the United States should even be considered as a
foreign power, you might have a choice in such a question.
159
Hamilton's letter furnishes a few clues. First, the letter indicates
that the authority of the Confederation Congress during the transi-
tion period and the participation of the non-ratifying States in transi-
tion matters was at least a debatable question. As Hamilton put the
point, "A doubt might perhaps be raised about your right to a vote
under the present circumstances." Second, the letter crisply suggests
that the Confederation Congress only had legal authority under the
Constitution as to certain transition matters. As Hamilton put the
point, the Confederation Congress was an assembly of "mere agents
under a special authority." Note how Hamilton observed that this
power was given to the Confederation Congress "by the ratifying
states" (either impliedly from the Constitution itself or extra-constitu-
tionally). An early draft of an implementing act of the Confederation
Congress provided that "the ratifications of the several States are to be
considered as containing virtual authority and Instructions to their
Delegates in Congress to make the preparatory Arrangements recom-
mended by the said Convention to be made by Congress." 160 Third,
the letter indicates that the Confederation Congress might have
greater powers under certain circumstances. In the realm of foreign
relations, the non-ratifying States might have a say. As Hamilton put
the point, "If the United States should even be considered as a foreign
power, [Rhode Island] might have a choice in such a question." Ham-
ilton's choice of language regarding this extraordinary case is equivo-
cal. The non-ratifying States "might," but not necessarily "would,"
have a say in these matters. Taken as a whole, Hamilton's letter sug-
gests that the transition between the Articles of Confederation and the
Constitution was not gapless.
The most interesting part of the inquiry into precedent relates to
the activities of the Confederation Congress for the new federal year
beginning November 3, 1788. The journal entry states, "Pursuant to
the Articles of the Confederation only two Gentlemen attended as del-
egates . . ".."161 These delegates were Benjamin Contee of Maryland
and Hugh Williamson of North Carolina. 162 Some of the delegates
from Virginia, South Carolina, New Jersey, and Massachusetts ap-
159 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Jeremiah Olney (Aug. 12, 1788), in 5 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 199, 199 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds.,
1962). The letter is quoted in part in Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 9, at 524 n.146.
160 34JOURNALS, supra note 141, at 387.
161 34 id. at 604 (footnote omitted).
162 34 id.
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peared in November and December of 1788; some of the delegates of
Pennsylvania appeared in January of 1789, and the delegates from
Rhode Island, New York, and New Hampshire did not appear until
February of 1789.163 An editor's note for thejournal entry for Novem-
ber 3, 1788 provides some elaboration:
This is the first day of the federal year 1788-1789. From this date to
March 2, 1789, delegates from the various states appeared and
presented their credentials, so that it would have been possible at
any time that seven states were present for the secretary to have read
the credentials and for Congress to have begun its sessions. Be-
cause of the organization of the new Government under the Consti-
tution, the Continental Congress for 1788-1789, never transacted
any business. 164
This editor's note is fascinating, suggesting that the Confedera-
tion Congress could have transacted business after November 3, 1788,
but did not perhaps because it was inexpedient to do so.
Does the very fact that all of the original thirteen States sent dele-
gates to the Confederation Congress for the new federal year
1788-1789 mean that the Confederation Congress had legal authority
under the Articles of Confederation during the transition period?165
Maybe. As Professor Ackerman and then-student Katyal stated (in an-
other context), "This is curious behavior for states who were allegedly
treating the Articles as nullities. '1 66 But maybe not. It is a most slip-
pery exercise to infer from the fact that delegates were sent to the
Confederation Congress alone that the Confederation Congress had
real legal authority under the Articles of Confederation. This Confed-
eration Congress might well have been a "rump" congress acting as a
de facto regime. 167
163 34 id. at 604-05.
164 34 id. at 604 n.1.
165 This was the only time in the history of the Continental Congress that all of the
original thirteen States sent delegates to Congress (seven States constituted a quo-
rum). See Roscoe R. Hill & Herbert Putnam, Prefatory Note to 34Joui,.ALS, supra note
141, at v; see also Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 9, at 520 (noting this point). For the
appointments by the several States of delegates to the Confederation Congress, see 34
JOURNALS, supra note 141, at 609-16; and Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 9, at 520
n.132.
166 Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 9, at 557.
167 Indeed, Professor Ackerman has argued that the Thirty-Ninth Congress-the
Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment-was a "rump" Congress be-
cause of the Northerners' (Republicans') exclusion of Southern senators and repre-
sentatives. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 99-252. What is sauce for the goose is
sauce for the gander. The mere fact that the Thirty-Ninth Congress convened is not
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Some scholars might take issue with the statement that the Con-
federation Congress transacted no business after that time. As Acker-
man and Katyal also noted, "The final important act of the
Confederacy [under the Articles] was not in November [of 1788], but
in January [of 1789] -when its governor for the Northwest Territory,
Arthur St. Clair, negotiated a treaty with the Wyandot."1 68 This treaty,
known as the Treaty of Fort Harmar, was made on January 9, 1789,
but was never approved by the Confederation Congress pursuant to
the Articles of Confederation. The First Senate ratified this treaty on
September 22, 1789.169
It is difficult to say that the making of the Treaty of Fort Harmar
is evidence that the Confederation Congress had legal authority
under the Articles of Confederation during the transition period.
The treaty was made by a deputy, not the Confederation Congress,
and was not considered by the latter. Indeed, the ratification of the
treaty by the First Senate strongly suggests that the treaty was not the
law of the land until September 22, 1789, although it remains possible
that the First Senate re-ratified the treaty out of an abundance of
caution.
What weight should precedent have in this debate? The question
is especially complicated by the fact that the Confederation Congress
did very little after the adoption of the Constitution in the early sum-
mer of 1788 and virtually nothing after the beginning of the new fed-
eral year in November of 1788. The fact that the Confederation
Congress continued to exist (even if not in session) until the spring of
1789 is evidence of a gapless transition between the Articles of Con-
federation and the Constitution, maybe even strong evidence, but
surely not conclusive evidence. On this point, Lawson and Seidman
would probably agree. 17° The precedent (whatever its precise scope)
of the Confederation Congress is not so much more persuasive than
the precedent of the Virginia Legislature passing the unconstitutional
statute at issue in Owings, although it is harder to dismiss the action of
all thirteen original States as equally anomalous.
dispositive of its legal status, just as the mere fact that the Confederation Congress
convened after the adoption of the Constitution is not dispositive of its legal status.
168 Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 9, at 558.
169 See id. at 558 n.247 (citing sources); see also First Federal Congress Project, The
Senate and Foreign Affairs, in Birth of the Nation: The First Federal Congress
1789-1791, at http://www.gwu.edu/-ffcp/exhibit/p9/p9_8.html (last modified Jan.
25, 2002) (online exhibit).
170 See Lawson & Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, supra note 1, at
35 n.126.
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V. TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF TRANSITION
A short summary of our interpretive journey is appropriate. The
text of the Constitution provides no clear and convincing answer to
the transition question. The extra-textual evidence from the early
state constitutions suggests that the transition between the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution was not gapless. The extra-tex-
tual evidence from the public writings of the Federalists weakly sug-
gests the same. The extra-textual evidence from the secret drafting
history of the Constitution strongly suggests the same. Finally, the ex-
tra-textual evidence from precedent suggests the opposite-that the
transition between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution
was in fact gapless.
The transition question is truly a tough nut to crack. The chief
problem with the transition question is that we are trying to posit an
alternative universe whose precise facts are under-specified. This is a
problem with much of constitutional law. We are left to fill in the
holes based on faithful interpretation of the evidence from (at least)
text, history, and structure. 71 Sometimes the vectors of relevant evi-
dence are of varying length and direction.
How should we think about a general transition theory? The vir-
tue of Lawson and Seidman's answer to the transition question,
though they do not mention it, is that the transition between the two
regimes of the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution was
gapless. It would seem that given a choice between an interregnum
and not, one would prefer not. But then again, there was at the time
nothing terribly shocking about having no federal governmental au-
thority for the relatively short period of time between the Constitu-
tion's adoption and its full effective date.
There are some practical considerations worthy of attention.
Maybe the lame duck Confederation Congress had full legal authority
under the Articles of Confederation during the transition period but
chose not to overreach, absent exigent circumstances. Any such ac-
tion, taken by the Confederation Congress in good faith and with the
support of pro-Constitution leaders such as James Madison, George
171 It is well beyond the scope of this Essay to argue that text, history, and structure
must be a part of good constitutional interpretation. Cf Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-
Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV.
205, 207-08 n.7 (1985) (stating that "interpretivist" methodology is valuable whether
or not one subscribes to its results). Here, I do consciously omit doctrine and other
considerations such as prudence and ethics. For a general discussion of those three
arguments in constitutional interpretation, see PHILIP BOBBTT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 39-73, 93-119 (1982).
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Washington, and James Wilson to name just a few, presumably would
have had the support of the Founders. This would be a prudential but
not strictly legal limitation of transition authority-the old regime
should not take action (pursuant to the power of the old regime, of
course) with respect to matters that can await consideration by the
new regime. And what about the run-of-the-mill matters performed
by the federal government under the Articles of Confederation? For
example, who would keep the soldiers clothed, fed, and paid and the
post office in operation? 172
It was not indispensably necessary to have a federal government
in existence during the transition period in order to keep the country
running. There could be effective transition between the two regimes
of the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution without an in-
terim federal government. The purpose of the Engagements Clause
was to provide that the obligations of the federal government under
the Articles of Confederation would be obligations of the new federal
government under the Constitution as well. And the several state gov-
ernments could pick up any slack.
There is at least one crucial logistical consideration as well. A
gapless transition implies that during the transition period the Con-
federation Congress had legal authority under the Articles of Confed-
eration to govern for the benefit of all of the original thirteen States,
even though the new regime was among and only for the benefit of
the ratifying States. This is very odd, but perhaps not absolutely un-
thinkable. A hypothetical example involving the Confederation Con-
gress during the transition period reveals the oddity. Imagine that
only the sufficient number of nine States under Article VII ratified the
Constitution before the First Congress convened. (This was not the
case because Virginia and New York ratified soon after New Hamp-
shire did, becoming the tenth and eleventh States respectively to join
the Union.) Thus, the Confederation Congress would be composed
of the nine ratifying States and four non-ratifying States. Given that
the consent of nine States was necessary under the Articles of Confed-
eration for most governance matters,173 it is possible that all nine rati-
fying States could have their way if they wanted to do X in the
172 Ackerman and Katyal raise a similar set of questions:
[i]f [the Confederation] Congress had dissolved, how would the Dutch be
convinced to float a loan for continued payment of interest on the national
debt? Who would conduct diplomacy with foreign powers? Who would deal
with Native Americans? On a more humdrum but hardly unimportant level,
who would run the Confederacy's postal service?
Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 9, at 522.
173 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION arts. IX, X, XI, (U.S. 1781).
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transitional regime. 174 But that is not the only possibility. What if all
nine ratifying States did not agree among themselves to do X?. In such
a case, at least one non-ratifying State could have a decisive vote in
doing X, which if done, would bind ratifying and non-ratifying States
alike. Indeed, at the extreme, five ratifying States and four non-ratify-
ing States could agree to do X. If the Confederation Congress had
legal authority during the transition period, then one must take into
account the oddity of giving non-ratifying States any say in the transi-
tional regime. 75 This seems too odd to be true.
The interesting question that remains relates to necessity. What
if Great Britain or France had attacked the United States between the
early summer of 1788 and the spring of 1789? Would the Confedera-
tion Congress have had authority under the Articles of Confederation
to enter into a treaty of peace? Would that treaty of peace be the law
of the land under the Supremacy Clause?
Surely the United States did not cease to exist as a nation during
the transition period. 176 One answer to this hypothetical question is,
of course, that the Confederation Congress had legal authority under
the Articles of Confederation during the transition period to make
and ratify such a treaty of peace. But the argument from necessity
surely does not mean that the Confederation Congress necessarily had
such authority. Another answer is that in such an emergency there
would have been a de facto regime comprised of all of the original
thirteen States, or more precisely, of the States that had ratified the
174 In addition, the nine ratifying States could also have their way if they did not
want to do X because any five or more of them would have blocking rights under the
Articles (thirteen States minus five ratifying States is eight States-one less than the
number needed under most governance matters). Lawson and Seidman astutely note
this point in their Reply. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 48, at 98 (noting that the
nine ratifying States "could block any action that threatened to interfere with the
smooth future functioning of the new government," including treaties and achieving
a quorum).
175 It is worth remembering, too, that there is nothing magical about the number
nine in Article VII-the Framers considered lower and higher numbers, see 2
RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 468-69, but settled on the number
nine probably because it was "a respectable majority of the whole" and "a number
made familiar by the constitution of the existing Congress." See 2 id. at 469 (remarks
of Gov. Edmund Randolph). Had the Framers chosen a lower number, such as seven
or eight, for Article VII as James Wilson advocated, see 2 id. at 468-69, the assent of at
least one non-ratifying State would have been required in order for the Confederation
Congress under the Articles to do X This strikes me as preposterous.
176 On the birthdate of the United States as 1776, see THE DECLARATION OF INDE-
PENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
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Constitution at that point in time.177 This de facto regime of ratifying
States would have had the power to make and ratify a treaty of peace,
which would bind its successor regime. 178 Perhaps the first Senate
would have re-ratified such a treaty of peace out of an abundance of
caution. The important point is that there is a difference-a legal
difference-between a de facto regime and a de jure one.
A general transition theory is limited by our ability to peer into
the hypothetical past. There are some reasons to think that the Con-
federation Congress had legal authority under the Articles of Confed-
eration during the transition period, but better reasons to think
otherwise. The takeaway point is this: the answer to the transition
question is hardly an open-and-shut case. 179
177 For a good general discussion of de facto regimes and their power to bind
their successor regimes, see generally Harrison, supra note 14 (arguing for the legiti-
macy of the Reconstruction Congress and their enactment of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendment).
178 The de facto regime of ratifying States would probably be governed by majority
rule of the number of States. As a corollary, a de facto regime (or regimes) or non-
ratifying States would have the power to make and ratify a treaty of peace for those
States, and obviously not be bound by the de facto regime of ratifying States.
179 In the closing pages of their reply, Lawson and Seidman attempt to shift the
burden of proof onto me. Their argument is that "[s]omeone who asserts that the
Constitution forbids a ratifying State from participating in the Confederation during
the period of transition is claiming a constitutional restriction on States and therefore
bears the burden of proof." Lawson & Seidman, supra note 48, at 100. This burden-
of-proof argument fails for three reasons. First, a constitutional restriction on ratify-
ing States not to participate simultaneously (even for a short time period) in another
governmental regime comprised of ratifying and non-ratifying States is of a funda-
mentally different kind than a constitutional restriction on ratifying States not to do X
because Xis a power given to the federal government or retained by "We the People"
of the United States; the former is a division of power between two Unions with differ-
ent members, whereas the latter is a division of power within one Union. The appro-
priate presumption is that the Constitution is presumed to be an exclusive Union for
and among ratifying States. See supra note 70 (citing constitutional provisions). Sec-
ond, I took this project in principal part because of what I took to be a compelling
interpretive baseline/presumption from Lawson and Seidman's careful research into
early constitutions, statutes, and treaties: the new regime displaces the old, unless
otherwise specified. If I have misread Lawson and Seidman on this important point,
mea culpa. When it comes to choosing between a specific presumption of the transi-
tion question and a general presumption of the exclusivity of the Union under the
Constitution, on the one hand, and a general one of the powers retained by the sev-
eral States, on the other hand, I will choose the former, and leave it to the gentle
reader to decide, based on the presumption and the arguments presented, which of
us has the better case.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Professors Lawson and Seidman are surely to be congratulated
for bringing to the fore the fascinating question of when the Constitu-
tion became law. After 213 and not 212 years of the Republic (as we
can now confidently say), Lawson and Seidman have now put to rest a
longstanding but neglected question of constitutional law. Lawson
and Seidman also deserve credit for announcing a general theory of
constitutional effectiveness that, for the most part, is correct. But Law-
son and Seidman are to be criticized for pushing one valuable conclu-
sion too far. That some parts of the Constitution were not effective at
the adoption date does not necessarily mean that the old regime con-
tinued to exercise authority until the new regime became effective.
One could say that (1) Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution was
effective in the early summer of 1788 and that (2) Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution was effective in the spring of 1789 and also say that
(3) there was an interregnum between the early summer of 1788 and
the spring of 1789. Lawson and Seidman unnecessarily conclude that
the transition between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitu-
tion was gapless. They do so on the barest of evidence. On this point,
their theory of constitutional effectiveness is simply not proved.
